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INTRODUCTION 
Laws send messages.1  The enactment of legislation itself sends a signal that 
society endorses a certain message.  But much of a law’s communicative impact is 
not felt until later and is bound up with whether and how the legislation is en-
forced.  Notably, the actors making enforcement decisions have incentives and 
resource constraints that may differ considerably from those of legislators.  In this 
Article, I use the example of hate crime legislation to explore why enforcement 
decisions made against the background of those constraints may result in a mis-
match between lawmakers’ intended message and that delivered by enforcement. 
Legislative history suggests that hate crime law proponents intended to send 
a strong message of tolerance and equality, signaling to all members of society 
that hatred and prejudice on the basis of identity will be punished with extra se-
verity.2  Senator Ted Kennedy, one of the main supporters of federal hate crime 
legislation, explained, “Just as hate crimes have been characterized as ‘message 
crimes,’ passage of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act will send a clear message that 
the nation intends to do all it can to punish those who commit acts of violence 
fueled by hatred.”3  Similar expressive rhetoric can be found throughout state and 
federal legislative history and focuses on the importance of sending a message 
condemning hateful motives and favoring tolerance.4 
Hate crime laws are primarily designed to address archetypal cases involving 
(1) animus; (2) a defendant who belongs to one identity group and a victim who 
belongs to a different group; and (3) a choice of victim that is largely symbolic, 
such that one victim is interchangeable with, and serves as a representative of, 
other members of the victim’s identity group.5  The outer limits of hate crime 
prosecution are jurisdiction specific, but when all three factors are present, the 
underlying crime could be charged as a hate crime according to any jurisdiction’s 
  
1. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Richard 
H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000); Richard H. 
Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 
J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2021 (1996). 
2. The expressive theory behind hate crime legislation is well documented.  See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, 
Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal Enforcement?, 80 
B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1265–66 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 413, 463–67 (1999). 
3. Edward M. Kennedy, Hate Crimes: The Unfinished Business of America, BOS. B.J., Jan./Feb. 2000, at 
6, 23 (footnote omitted). 
4. See infra Part I B. 
5. See infra Part I.C.  Here, archetypal refers not to a normative ideal of hate crime legislation but to a 
distillation from positive law.  
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hate crime statute.  By contrast, in a nonarchetypal case, one or more of the three 
aforementioned factors is missing, and the case may appear less like a hate crime 
and more like an ordinary crime of opportunity. 
At present, hate crime laws are on the books in forty-eight states and the 
District of Columbia.6  In 2009, President Obama signed the Matthew Shepard 
and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act,7 which protects victims target-
ed based on their race, color, religion, national origin, actual or perceived gender, 
sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability.  In some states, hate crime laws 
prohibit targeting based on traits such as age, political affiliation, and personal 
appearance.8 
Scholars tend to examine hate crime legislation as a homogeneous unit 
across jurisdictions,9 and most either decry the laws as unnecessary and unconsti-
tutional or praise the laws for their positive message and vision of a more tolerant 
society.10  Despite the prevalence of these normative discussions about hate crime 
enactment, hate crime enforcement and specifically institutional incentives at the 
enforcement stage remain largely undocumented and undertheorized. 
This Article fills that gap in the academic literature, challenging conven-
tional understandings about the messaging function of hate crime laws and em-
pirically documenting enforcement practices.  It presents the first multistate 
qualitative empirical study of hate crime prosecution, compiling original data 
from semistructured interviews with fifty-two prosecutors from twenty-three 
states and the District of Columbia about their enforcement decisions.11 
  
6. See infra Appendix II: State Hate Crime Laws. 
7. Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2835 (2009). 
8. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-3701(1) (2001) (“‘Bias-related crime’ means a designated act that 
demonstrates an accused’s prejudice based on the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national 
origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, gender identity or 
expression, family responsibility, homelessness, physical disability, matriculation, or political 
affiliation of a victim . . . .”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-20 (LexisNexis 2007) (protecting those 
targeted on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation or 
disability”). 
9. See, e.g., Lu-in Wang, Unwarranted Assumptions in the Prosecution and Defense of Hate Crimes, 
CRIM. JUST., Fall 2002, at 4.  On the rare occasion that a vertical approach is used and specific 
aspects of a jurisdiction’s hate crime legislation are explored, the scholarly inquiry is generally 
limited to the development of a particular state’s hate crime law without reference to parallel 
developments in other jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Alex Ginsberg, Note, Hate Is Enough: How New 
York’s Bias Crimes Statute Has Exceeded Its Intended Scope, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1599 (2011). 
10. Some scholars have also focused on whether a particular identity group, such as homeless 
individuals, should be included as a protected category in federal or state hate crime legislation.  See, 
e.g., Scott Steiner, Habitations of Cruelty: The Pitfalls of Expanding Hate Crime Legislation to Include 
the Homeless, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 810 (2009); Raegan Joern, Note, Mean Streets: Violence Against the 
Homeless and the Makings of a Hate Crime, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 305 (2009). 
11. My work is the first qualitative study of hate crime prosecution to examine more than one state and 
to interview more than sixteen prosecutors.  Two dissertations in the social sciences included 
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The Article asks: How do institutional incentives shape prosecutors’ en-
forcement decisions, and how does the pattern of enforcement complement or 
undermine the message of hate crime enactment?  It adopts an expansive defini-
tion of enforcement that includes not only ultimate punishment but also law en-
forcement decisions from initial police investigation through prosecutors’ 
charging decisions.  While other scholars have focused exclusively on the expres-
sive dimension of punishment,12 I argue that prosecution itself takes on an ex-
pressive dimension that can either further the message of a statute’s enactment or 
contradict it. 
A stark contrast emerges between the goals of hate crime laws as envisioned 
by legislators and the practical realities of prosecutorial discretion in deciding 
whether to add a hate crime charge.  While drafters of early hate crime legislation 
focused on addressing those manifestations of identity-based hate that risk trau-
matizing communities and rendering individuals vulnerable based on their group 
identity,13 prosecutorial incentives may cut against charging such archetypal cases 
as hate crimes. 
Consider a recent case in Houston, Texas.  On April 22, 2006, two white 
teens with ties to the white supremacist movement brutalized David Ritcheson, a 
seventeen-year-old Hispanic boy.  Local papers reported that the defendants 
“dragged the victim into a backyard and then sodomized him with a plastic pipe 
from a patio table umbrella,” poured bleach on him, and left him for dead.14  
Witnesses testified that the attackers called Ritcheson a “wetback” and a “spic” as 
  
interviews with prosecutors from a single state, and one of these focused exclusively on a single 
office.  See Stephanie D. Cappadona, Which Bias Crimes Get Prosecuted? An Analysis of Bias 
Motivated Incidents and Prosecutions in the City of Boston, Massachusetts 2007–2008 (Apr. 20, 
2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northeastern Univ.) (on file with author) (drawing on 
interviews with fifteen Assistant District Attorneys in Boston); Beverly Anne McPhail, 
Constructing Justice: Prosecutorial Decision Making in Hate Crime Enhancements (Dec. 2002) 
(unpublished Ph D. dissertation, Univ. of Tex. at Austin) (on file with author) (drawing on 
interviews with sixteen prosecutors in Texas).  For a comprehensive treatment of empirical 
methods in legal analysis, see ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 
(2010).  For details of the study’s methodology, see infra Part II.A. and Appendix I: Qualitative 
Methodology. 
12. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING & DESERVING: 
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95 (1970); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of 
Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992). 
13. Proponents of hate crime legislation have referred to crimes motivated by hate as “attack[ing] the 
victim not only physically but at the very core of his identity” and as resulting in “[s]tigmatization . . . 
shown to bring about ‘humiliation, isolation and self-hatred.’”  Frederick M. Lawrence, The 
Evolving Federal Role in Bias Crime Law Enforcement and the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, 19 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 251, 255–56 (2008). 
14. Jaime Castillo, Is Harris County Prosecutor Thinking What Makes a Hate Crime?, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS-NEWS, May 6, 2006, at 1B. 
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they continued to beat him long after he was already unconscious.15  Ritcheson’s 
attackers were covered in “White power and swastika tattoos” and one of his at-
tackers had recently assaulted two other Hispanics, nearly killing one of them.16 
Despite the fact that this case featured the characteristics of an archetypal 
hate crime, prosecutors did not charge either of the defendants with a hate crime 
enhancement.17  This provoked an outcry from interest group leaders who ex-
pressed feelings of betrayal; while they fought hard to pass hate crime legislation, 
the lack of enforcement suggested that they had achieved only a symbolic victory.  
Newspapers teemed with opinion pieces insisting that this was a hate crime and 
should be charged as such.18  More than 30 legislators signed a letter imploring 
Chuck Rosenthal, the Harris County District Attorney, to add a hate crime 
charge.19 
So why did prosecutors refuse to charge this case as a hate crime?  Mike 
Trent, the Harris County prosecutor, explained that adding hate crime charges in 
this case would have had no legal effect because it was already a first-degree felo-
ny and could not be elevated any higher.20  A look at the relevant hate crime stat-
ute confirms that, in Texas, a hate crime charge, if proven, would increase the 
defendant’s sentence by one category except in the case of class A misdemeanors 
and first-degree felonies.  Indeed, in the Ritcheson case, a hate crime charge, even 
if proven, could not have increased the defendants’ sentencing range. 
In implementing hate crime laws, prosecutors may share legislators’ objec-
tives, but not in isolation.  They are also motivated by efficiency concerns, such as 
the difficulty of proving that a crime was motivated by animus or the fact that, 
even if one did prove animus, conviction on a hate crime charge might increase an 
  
15. Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 67 (2007) [hereinafter 
Hearing] (statement of David Ritcheson).  Ritcheson testified:  
After I was sucker-punched and knocked out, I was dragged into the backyard 
for an attack that would last for over an hour.  Two individuals, one an admitted 
racist skinhead, attempted to carve a swastika on my chest.  After they stripped me 
naked, they burned me with a cigarette, and I was kicked by the skinhead’s steel-
toed army boots.   
Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 68.  Ritcheson testified: “[D]espite the obvious bias motivation of the crime, it is very 
frustrating to me that neither the State of Texas nor the Federal Government was able to use hate 
crime laws to prosecute my attackers.”  Id. 
18. Some reports juxtaposed this heinous violent attack with other significantly less severe assaults that 
were charged as hate crimes, highlighting the inconsistency of hate crime prosecution.  See, e.g., 
Castillo, supra note 14. 
19. Id. 
20. No Hate Crime Charges After Brutal Attack, NBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2006, 2:49 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/12530133#.UuB3AtLTlaQ. 
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already lengthy prison sentence only incrementally, if at all.  This might dissuade 
a prosecutor from adding a hate crime charge despite substantial evidence of bias 
motivation. 
Conversely, when a hate crime law carries a substantial extra penalty, it 
might be used strategically by prosecutors in nonarchetypal cases, in which one or 
more of the three archetypal factors are absent, to encourage a plea bargain to 
lesser charges.  Consider New York’s hate crime statute, which includes age, de-
fined as sixty and older, as a protected category.  Enterprising prosecutors from 
the Queens’ Elder Fraud Unit recently have begun including hate crime charges 
in cases of alleged swindling involving elderly victims in which there is no evi-
dence of animus.  While the legislation’s preamble focuses on animus, asserting 
that “[c]rimes motivated by invidious hatred toward particular groups not only 
harm individual victims but send a powerful message of intolerance and discrimi-
nation to all members of the group to which the victim belongs,”21 the statute it-
self does not explicitly require a showing of animus.  Thus, a defendant who 
“intentionally selects” a victim because of a protected characteristic can be 
charged under New York’s hate crime statute whether the defendant was moti-
vated by identity-based prejudice or a determination that the victim would be an 
easy target.22  Furthermore, in New York a conviction for theft of less than $1 
million carries no mandatory prison time, whereas a conviction for “Grand Lar-
ceny as a Hate Crime” carries a minimum of one year in prison and could result in 
a sentence of up to twenty-five years.  This creates the following paradox: Hate 
crime laws may turn out to be most appealing to prosecutors, and therefore most 
used, in cases that do not involve identity-based animus, thus diluting the laws’ 
intended message promoting group tolerance. 
After examining the mismatch between enactment goals and enforcement 
realities, this Article considers ways in which legislators might more effectively 
preserve the intended message of hate crime legislation by better aligning prose-
cutorial incentives with legislative expression.23  As a starting point, when enact-
ing expressive legislation, legislators should consider carefully what messages they 
may be sending both ex ante to potential victims and defendants upon passage of 
the laws and ex post based on predictions of how prosecutors will use these laws 
in practice.  Legislators who intend for hate crime laws to express social values be-
  
21. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.00 (McKinney 2008). 
22. Id. § 485.05. 
23. Legislators concerned with the disparity between hate crime legislation and prosecution might also 
choose to repeal the legislation entirely, an approach that some scholars support.  See, e.g., JAMES B. 
JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY POLITICS 145 
(1998) (favoring a policy decision to “repeal the new wave of hate crime laws and enforce the 
generic criminal laws evenhandedly and without prejudice”). 
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yond enactment might take steps to encourage prosecutors to use the legislation 
in (and only in) archetypal hate crime cases, while remaining mindful of the 
broader criminal law context of which hate crime prosecution is only a part.  
While there is no one-size-fits-all way to reconcile messages of enactment with 
those of enforcement, an inquiry into enforcement incentives and effects is a nec-
essary first step toward resolving the disconnect between legislative and prosecu-
torial messaging. 
The Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I introduces the history and devel-
opment of hate crime laws, highlighting the legislative desire to send a message 
decrying bigotry and promoting tolerance.  Part II examines hate crime enforce-
ment, documenting prosecutorial incentives as they relate to charging decisions 
and the expressive effects of these enforcement decisions.  Part III recommends 
ways to improve coordination between institutional actors by better aligning 
prosecutorial incentives with legislative expression, a crucial step toward com-
municating a coherent message in the hate crime context and throughout crimi-
nal law. 
I. THE ENACTMENT OF HATE CRIME LEGISLATION 
To explore the relationship between the promulgation and enforcement of 
hate crime laws, it is first necessary to situate the enactment of hate crime legisla-
tion in the criminal law lexicon.  This Part outlines the origins, development, and 
expressed purpose behind hate crime legislation.  It also examines the academic 
justifications for hate crime laws, highlighting the rhetorical dominance of ex-
pressive theory. 
A. Origins and Development 
The Civil Rights Act of 1968,24 signed into law during the riots that fol-
lowed the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., is the most direct precursor to 
modern hate crime legislation.25  It permitted federal prosecution of anyone who 
  
24. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73.  The 1968 Act was intended as a follow-up to the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, legislation designed to give “all Americans the right 
to be served in facilities which are open to the public—hotels, restaurants, theaters, retail stores, and 
similar establishments,” as well as “greater protection for the right to vote.”  John F. Kennedy, 
President of the U.S., Address on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963) (transcript available at 
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3375). 
25. Some scholars trace the origin of hate crime legislation back to the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 
enacted by the U.S. Congress to combat lynching and other bias-motivated violence in the post–
Reconstruction Era South.  ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
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“by force or threat of force willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or 
attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because of his race, 
color, religion or national origin” while the victim attempted to engage in 
federally protected activities such as voting, attending school, and enjoying 
public accommodations.26  The words “by force,” combined with the histori-
cal backdrop of the statute—persecution of African Americans by whites on 
the basis of race—suggest the legislation’s preoccupation with combating 
hateful, intergroup conduct, or the threat thereof, which was intended to in-
timidate the victim along with other members of the victim’s identity group.  
Despite these early efforts, however, federal prosecution under the Act was 
rare because of the requirement that a victim be engaged in a federally pro-
tected activity and the limited categories of victims protected by the legisla-
tion.27  Federal efforts to track hate crimes were also stymied because, despite 
Congressional requirements to collect hate crime data, local and state report-
ing to federal authorities was (and remains) voluntary.28  Many jurisdictions 
therefore do not submit any data.29 
  
INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 
1866-1876, at 53–55 (1985).  The Ku Klux Klan Act declared it a federal offense to: 
[C]onspire together, or go in disguise upon the public highway or upon the premis-
es of another for the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of depriving any person or 
any class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or im-
munities under the laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constitut-
ed authorities of any State from giving or securing to all persons within such State 
the equal protection of the laws. 
Ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (2006)).  
Few convictions were made under the Klan Act and, even when the Justice Department 
obtained convictions, Southern judges often refused to enhance sentences based on evidence of 
bias.  See KACZOROWSKI, supra. 
26. 18 U.S.C. § 245 (b)(2) (2012). 
27. Ryken Grattet & Valerie Jenness, The Birth and Maturation of Hate Crime Policy in the United 
States, 45 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 668 (2001). 
28. In 1990, Congress passed, and President George H. W. Bush signed into law, the Hate Crime 
Statistics Act (HCSA), the first federal legislation requiring the Justice Department to collect data 
on crimes that “manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or 
ethnicity” from law enforcement agencies nationwide and to publish an annual summary of the 
findings.  Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 534 note (2012)).  In 1994, Congress expanded coverage of the HCSA, 
passing the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (VCCLEA), which required the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to report on crimes based on disability.  Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.  The 
VCCLEA also required the U.S. Sentencing Commission to establish guidelines for sentencing 
that would increase penalties for those convicted of hate crimes under federal law.  Id. tit XXVIII, § 
280003, 103 Stat. at 2096 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2012)). 
29. For example, in 2005, neither New York City nor Phoenix submitted hate crimes data.  Hearing, 
supra note 15, at 87 (statement of Jack McDevitt, Assoc. Dean, Northeastern Univ.); see ANTI-
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Various attempts to expand the scope of federal hate crime legislation, in-
cluding the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1997, the Hate Crimes Prevention 
Act of 1999, and the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 
2007, were unsuccessful.30  In 2009, however, at a packed White House ceremo-
ny and following an outpouring of support by interest groups, advocacy organiza-
tions, and victims’ families, President Barack Obama signed into law the 
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, which ex-
panded the categories of protected victims to include those targeted because of 
actual or perceived gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, and disability.31  
Obama hailed the hate crimes bill as a crucial step that would “help protect our 
citizens from violence based on what they look like, who they love, how they 
pray.”32  While the 2009 Act was significantly more expansive than its 1968 pre-
cursor,33 Obama’s remarks highlighted the link between the modern federal hate 
  
DEFAMATION LEAGUE, COMPILATION OF FBI HATE CRIME STATISTICS ACT DID NOT 
REPORT (DNR) AND ZERO REPORTING (Nov. 2011) (on file with author).  
30. Each of these federal hate crime bills died in committee.  See Isabelle Cutting, Hate Crimes 
Legislation, Now Riding on the DoD Bill, OPEN CONGRESS BLOG (July 17, 2009), 
http://www.opencongress.org/articles/view/1106-Hate-Crimes-Legislation-Now-Riding-on-
the-DoD-Bill.  Other attempts to target hate crimes have also failed.  For example, the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA) was included in Title IV of the VCCLEA and provided $1.6 
billion to enhance the investigation and prosecution of violent crimes perpetrated against women.  
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 13981 (2006)).  VAWA’s Subtitle C also created a federal civil remedy, on top of existing 
state remedies, for violence motivated by gender-based animus.  Id. § 40032, 108 Stat. at 1941-42 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c)).  In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Subtitle C for 
exceeding congressional power, though the funding provisions of the Act remained in effect.  
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  While the Court agreed with the government 
that there was a “voluminous congressional record” supporting the “assertion that there is pervasive 
bias in various state justice systems against victims of gender-motivated violence” and that “state-
sponsored gender discrimination violates equal protection unless it serves important governmental 
objectives,” the majority ruled that, even if there is unconstitutional state action, that action justifies 
Congress in targeting only the state actors, not private parties.  Id. at 599–600, 620–21 (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
31. The 2009 Hate Crimes Prevention Act was attached to the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2010.  Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009).  Congress grounded its 
authority for enacting federal hate crime legislation in the Thirteenth Amendment (for the 
categories of race and ethnicity) and the Commerce Clause (for the other categories of religion, 
gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, and disability).  See Lawrence, supra note 13, at 272.  
Many have questioned the constitutionality of the Act but, to date, no plaintiffs have successfully 
challenged it.  See, e.g., United States v. Beebe, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D.N.M. 2011).  For an 
academic challenge to the constitutionality of federal hate crime legislation, see John S. Baker, Jr., 
United States v. Morrison and Other Arguments Against Federal “Hate Crime” Legislation, 80 B.U. 
L. REV. 1191 (2000). 
32. Obama Signs Hate Crimes Bill Into Law, CNN (Oct. 28, 2009), http://edition.cnn.com/ 
2009/POLITICS/10/28/hate.crimes/index.html. 
33. The 2009 Act dispensed with the federal nexus requirement for the protected categories of race 
and ethnicity; however, the new protected categories, such as sexual orientation and gender 
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crime law and its civil rights era predecessor, emphasizing the importance of the 
new legislation as a way to combat violent attacks against people based on core 
features of their identity. 
Given that, until recently, the scope of federal hate crime legislation was ex-
tremely limited, most hate crime prosecutions occur at the state level.  The earli-
est state hate crime proposals date back to the 1980s and were supported by both 
civil rights and victims’ rights movements.34  Today, only Georgia and South 
Carolina lack hate crime statutes.35  All existing state hate crime statutes include 
the categories of race, ethnicity, and religion.  Some states include the additional 
federally protected categories of disability, sexual orientation, gender, and gender 
identity.36  A few states have expanded the protected categories further to include 
such categories as age, political affiliation, and personal appearance.37 
B. Legislative Focus on “Sending a Message” 
An examination of the legislative debates over hate crime laws suggests that 
legislators drafted the laws to send a strong message of tolerance and equality to 
perpetrators and victim groups alike and to signal to all members of society that 
hatred and prejudice based on identity will be punished with extra severity.  Ex-
cerpts from legislative hearings over the past two decades illustrate the persistence 
of expressive rhetoric focusing on “sending a message.”38 
  
identity, still require a federal nexus. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 §§ 
4701–4713. 
34. Terry A. Maroney, Note, The Struggle Against Hate Crime: Movement at a Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 564, 579 (1998).  In 1981, the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai Brith (ADL), perceiving 
that the number of hate crimes nationwide was rising sharply and that the criminal justice system 
was failing to handle the prosecution of hate crimes effectively, proposed a model hate crime 
statute.  The language of the ADL statute was adopted by a majority of those states that passed 
hate crime legislation.  STEVEN M. FREEMAN ET AL., ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, HATE 
CRIMES LAWS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 1, 2–3 (1994).  According to the model hate crime 
statute, a penalty enhancement could elevate the punishment for an underlying crime if the 
defendant acted against persons or groups “on account of their actual or perceived race, color, 
religion, national origin, or sexual orientation.”  Anti-Defamation League’s Model Legislation: A 
Primer for Action, in BIAS CRIME: AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LEGAL RESPONSES 
206, 207 (Robert J. Kelly ed., rev. ed. 1993). 
35. For a comparison of state statutes, see infra Appendix II: State Hate Crime Laws. 
36. At present, thirty-two states cover sexual orientation, thirty-one cover disability, twenty-eight cover 
gender, and seven cover gender identity.  See infra Appendix II: State Hate Crime Laws.  Five states 
cover all the federally protected categories.  Infra Appendix II: State Hate Crime Laws. 
37. Ten hate crime statutes cover age, four cover homelessness, three cover political affiliation, and one 
covers matriculation and personal appearance.  Infra Appendix II: State Hate Crime Laws. 
38. An examination of the relevant legislative history reveals the predominance of expressive rhetoric in 
debates about hate crime laws.  See, e.g., The Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009); Hearing, supra note 15; Bias Crimes: 
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Expressive rhetoric saturates the congressional debates over federal hate 
crime legislation.  For example, Senator Levin encouraged the U.S. Senate to 
“send a clear message that America is an all-inclusive nation—one that does not 
tolerate acts of violence based on bigotry and discrimination”—and stressed that 
hate crime legislation “will send the message that we are a country that treasures 
equality and tolerance.”39  Senator Rockefeller described the legislation as “vital to 
make a clear statement against all violent hate crimes,”40 and Senator Feinstein 
affirmed that hate crime legislation “would send the right message.”41  Senator 
Cardin also referred to the message sent through hate crime legislation, explain-
ing, “The message when we pass this—and I certainly hope that we will pass 
this—is that America has made a priority protecting people from violence be-
cause of diversity, that diversity is embraced in America as our strength.”42 
State lawmakers have also emphasized their desire to send a message 
through the enactment of hate crime legislation.  Just after the enactment of the 
Texas hate crime statute, the bill’s Senate sponsor, Rodney Ellis, declared, “This 
is truly an historic day for the state of Texas . . . . The Texas Senate has sent a 
  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d 
Cong. (1992). 
39. 146 CONG. REC. S5334–35 (daily ed. June 19, 2000) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin); see also 146 
CONG. REC. S5345 (daily ed. June 19, 2000) (statement of Sen. John Breaux) (urging the U.S. 
Senate to “send a clear message throughout this country that these types of activities in this country 
will not be tolerated”); 146 CONG. REC. S5302 (daily ed. June 16, 2000) (statement of Sen. Ron 
Wyden) (describing the need “to send a strong and unequivocal message that we will not look the 
other way in the face of these crimes, that they will not be tolerated”); 146 CONG. REC. H9965 
(daily ed. Oct. 13, 1999) (statement of Rep. Gregory Meeks) (urging Congress to “send a loud and 
clear message that those who want to hate others because they are different than they, it will not be 
tolerated”).  Senator Lieberman also spoke in distinctly expressive terms, suggesting that hate crime 
legislation was “another way for our society to express our disdain . . . at acts of violence committed 
based on a person’s race, religion, nationality, gender, disability, or sexual orientation.”  146 CONG. 
REC. S5303 (daily ed. June 16, 2000) (statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman). 
40. 146 CONG. REC. S5433 (daily ed. June 20, 2000) (statement of Sen. Jay Rockefeller). 
41. 146 CONG. REC. S5432 (daily ed. June 20, 2000) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein); see also 145 
CONG. REC. H3066 (daily ed. May 12, 1999) (statement of Rep. James McGovern) (emphasizing 
the broader harm caused by hate crimes to victims and their communities as the reason why a stern 
opposing message is crucial and highlighting the need to “send a clear and powerful message that we 
will not tolerate these violent acts which not only change the life of the victim, but affect the entire 
community”); 145 CONG. REC. H9961 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1999) (statement of Rep. Jan 
Schakowsky) (“The Hate Crimes Prevention Act is such an opportunity to send a clear and powerful 
message that the safety of all people is a priority and anyone who threatens that safety will face the 
consequences.”); 153 CONG. REC. H4445 (daily ed. May 3, 2007) (statement of Rep. Rush Holt) 
(“By making our Nation’s hate crimes statutes more comprehensive, we will take a needed step in 
favor of tolerance and against prejudice and hate-based crime in all its forms.  This legislation sends a 
strong message that hate-based crime cannot be tolerated and will be vigorously prosecuted.”). 
42. The Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, supra note 38 (statement of Sen. Ben Cardin). 
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message that our state is not a safe haven for hate.”43  The text of New York’s hate 
crime statute recognizes “the gravity of hate crimes” and the extensive harm re-
sulting from hate-motivated crimes, which “not only harm individual victims but 
send a powerful message of intolerance and discrimination to all members of the 
group to which the victim belongs.”44 
Those skeptical of hate crime laws echo proponents of the legislation in 
their use of expressive rhetoric.  Senator Joseph Bruno, the majority leader of the 
New York Senate who blocked the hate crime legislation for eleven years before 
changing course and deciding to support it, explained,  
“I don’t believe that a bias or hate bill by itself is going to do anything 
to reduce crime.  But . . . the message that we’re focusing on people 
who have malice in their hearts or hate or a bias towards an individual 
or group . . . maybe the time has come for us to send (that message) 
out there.”45   
Even avowed detractors of hate crime legislation have used expressivist rhetori-
cal constructions.  For example, in decrying the wisdom of hate crime laws, 
Representative Gohmert focused on the “message” of hate crime legislation.  
He quipped, “[T]he message of the hate crime legislation today is apparently 
this: If you are going to shoot, brutalize or hurt someone, the majority in Con-
gress begs you not to hate us while you are shooting or brutalizing us.  Please 
make it a random, senseless act of violence.”46 
C. Archetypal Hate Crimes 
State hate crime statutes differ substantially, but they can be divided into 
two main categories: those that define hate crimes as motivated substantially or in 
part by “animus” or “prejudice” against the victim because of the victim’s group 
membership,47 and those that do not require a showing of animus but merely re-
quire that the victim be “intentionally selected” on the basis of group member-
  
43. Press Release, State Sen. Rodney Ellis, Senate Passes Byrd Act (May 7, 2001), available at 
http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/Senate/Members/Dist13/pr01/p050701b.htm. 
44. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.00 (McKinney 2008). 
45. Jordan Rau & Liam Pleven, Bias Bill Is Expected to Advance, NEWSDAY (USA), June 7, 2000, 
at A07. 
46. Hearing, supra note 15 (statement of Rep. Louie Gohmert). 
47. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085(1)(a) (West Supp. 2013) (“The penalty for any felony or 
misdemeanor shall be reclassified . . . if the commission of such felony or misdemeanor evidences 
prejudice based on the race, color, ancestry, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, 
homeless status, mental or physical disability, or advanced age of the victim[.]”). 
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ship.48  A typical animus-based hate crime statute requires proof of “prejudice,” 
“bigotry and bias,” or “hostility” based on the victim’s group identity.49  These 
statutes insist that the prosecutor prove that the defendant targeted the victim 
based on group identity and that hatred or prejudice was a central motivating fac-
tor in the crime.  By contrast, discriminatory selection statutes do not require 
proof of animus, but only that the defendant intentionally selected the victim be-
cause of the victim’s protected characteristic.50  Despite this statutory distinction, 
legislative history suggests that legislators enacted hate crime laws, regardless of 
statutory formulation, to further the “state interest in preventing crimes and 
threats motivated by bigotry and bias.”51  Therefore, while not every hate crime 
statute technically requires animus, the desire to combat intergroup prejudice and 
discrimination appears to have motivated the enactment of the legislation across 
jurisdictions.52 
When all three components of an archetypal hate crime—prejudice based 
on a protected characteristic, intergroup targeting, and symbolic victimization—
are present, the underlying crime could be charged as a hate crime according to 
  
48. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1304(a) (2007) (“Any person who commits, or attempts to 
commit, any crime as defined by the laws of this State, and who intentionally . . . [s]elects the 
victim because of the victim's race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or 
ancestry, shall be guilty of a hate crime.”). 
49. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085 (providing for a penalty enhancement if the crime “evidences 
prejudice based on” designated protected categories); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22c, § 32 
(LexisNexis 2010) (defining a hate crime as “any criminal act coupled with overt actions motivated 
by bigotry and bias”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6(I)(f) (2007) (extending the sentence of any 
offender who “[w]as substantially motivated to commit the crime because of hostility towards the 
victim’s religion, race, creed, sexual orientation” and other protected categories).  For a list of 
sample hate crime statutes, see FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES 
UNDER AMERICAN LAW 178–97 (1999). 
50. For examples of discriminatory selection statutes, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1304 (2007); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (2009); WIS. STAT. § 939.645 (2011–12). 
51. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.078 (West 2009) (Finding of Washington’s Malicious 
Harassment statute).  For a detailed treatment of the distinctions between animus-based statutes 
and discriminatory selection statutes, see LAWRENCE, supra note 49, at 29–39. 
52. It is also no coincidence that many hate crime bills have been named in memory of victims of 
intergroup hatred.  See, e.g., David Ray Ritcheson Hate Crime Prevention Act, H.R. 262, 111th 
Cong. (2009); Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-84, § 4701, 123 Stat. 2190, 2835 (2009); James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Act, TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 12.47 (West 2011).  Also notable is the choice of featured speakers—victims and 
victims’ family members—at hearings on proposed hate crime legislation.  See, e.g., Hearing, supra 
note 15, at 69–70 (featuring David Ritcheson, victim of a bias-motivated assault); The Hate Crimes 
Prevention Act of 1998: Hearing on S.J. Res. 1529 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 
36–39 (1998) (featuring Frances Mullins, daughter of James Byrd, Jr., for whom the federal hate 
crime legislation was eventually named); Bias Crimes: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime and 
Crim. Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 38, at 6–8 (featuring Peg Rivera, sister-in-law 
of Julio Rivera, whose killer confessed, “I killed him because he was gay”). 
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any jurisdiction’s hate crime statute.53  By contrast, a nonarchetypal case is miss-
ing one or more of these factors and may appear less like a hate crime and more 
like a crime of opportunity. 
Nonarchetypal cases test the boundaries of hate crime legislation, calling 
into question how narrowly the category of hate crimes should be circumscribed.  
For example, some scholars and practitioners argue that rape and domestic vio-
lence should be prosecuted routinely as hate crimes.54  Others, however, note 
that rape is already understood to be a heinous crime, and the existing punish-
ment for a convicted rapist is severe.55  Furthermore, to call rape a hate crime by 
definition even in the absence of any demonstration that the victim was selected 
as an identity group symbol may dilute the meaning of a hate crime.  Some rape 
cases involve a particular relationship between two individuals such that no plau-
sible argument could be made that the victim was chosen as a symbol or repre-
  
53. Many scholars assume that all categories of hate crime protection involve immutable traits.  See, e.g., 
LAWRENCE, supra note 49, at 40 (“[T]he bias crime victim cannot reasonably minimize the risks 
of future attacks because he is unable to change the characteristic that made him a victim.”).  This 
approach lacks persuasive force because, for example, age is immutable while religion is not, and 
while all hate crime statutes cover religion, only a few cover age.  This fact indicates that our 
intuition about age and religion as hate crime categories may not be related to their immutability. 
  Others query whether history (and especially historical persecution) should be a factor.  See, 
e.g., Allison Marston Danner, Bias Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Culpability in Context, 6 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 389, 450 (2002) (“Bias crime statutes should be limited to crimes committed 
against members of groups that experience discrimination . . . .”).  If so, we would want to limit hate 
crime charges to whites who harm blacks, men who harm women, heterosexuals who harm 
homosexuals, and so forth.  Yet for equal protection reasons, the reciprocal harms must also be 
covered.  History does reveal, however, what kinds of intergroup harms have been particularly 
egregious and stigmatizing in the past and may inform what protected categories are appropriate 
for inclusion. 
54. See Elizabeth A. Pendo, Recognizing Violence Against Women: Gender and the Hate Crimes Statistics 
Act, 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 157 (1994); Eric Rothschild, Recognizing Another Face of Hate 
Crimes: Rape as a Gender-Bias Crime, 4 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 231 (1993); Kristin L. 
Taylor, Treating Male Violence Against Women as a Bias Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 575 (1996); Steven 
Bennett Weisburd & Brian Levin, “On the Basis of Sex”: Recognizing Gender-Based Bias Crimes, 5 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 21 (1994); Kathryn M. Carney, Note, Rape: The Paradigmatic Hate 
Crime, 75 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 315 (2001). 
55. Before 1977, when the Supreme Court struck down the use of capital punishment in rape cases on 
Eighth Amendment grounds, rape was one of only a few crimes deemed death eligible.  Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598–600 (1977); see also JOSEPH A. MELUSKY & KEITH A. PESTO, 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 52 (2003).  
This is a common refrain among lawmakers who oppose the inclusion of gender in hate crime laws.  
See, e.g., Joe Cutbirth, Hate-Crime Bill Slows in Austin as Scope Widens, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Apr. 1, 1993, at 1 (“[W]e have very specific rape statutes, and we have sexual abuse 
statutes, and we have family violence statutes. . . . Crimes against women that are gender-specific 
crimes, we have other mechanisms to take care of . . . .” (quoting Texas State Rep. Scott Hochberg) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  Of course, this argument would also apply to any crime that 
could result in a lengthy sentence without the use of hate crime legislation, such as murder or 
aggravated assault. 
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sentative of a group.  In some cases, there might be a plausible, even if inexcusa-
ble, misunderstanding.  By contrast, the case of a serial rapist who victimizes 
women in such a way that one woman becomes a mere representative of women 
generally seems to fit squarely under even a narrow definition of hate crime.56 
Another nonarchetypal case might involve a crime motivated by animus in 
which the victim was targeted as a representative of the victim’s group but the de-
fendant and victim are part of the same identity group.  The main wrinkle here 
involves the level of granularity or specificity with which the group is defined.  An 
example is when the relevant subgroups (such as different denominations of a 
single religion) are so distinct in appearance or lifestyle that they may function, in 
context, as separate groups.  Imagine, for instance, a secular defendant of a reli-
gion targeting an orthodox member of that same religion by violently attacking 
him while poking fun at his religiously-inspired looks and lifestyle.  Or the re-
verse: Imagine a situation in which a secular individual is targeted and accused of 
being a heathen by an orthodox adherent of that same faith. 
Some might argue for extending hate crime legislation to cover such a case 
based on the notion that these two groups, while technically part of the same reli-
gion, are distinct enough that prosecuting such crimes as hate crimes is necessary 
to fulfill the expressive goals of the legislation.  Others might support a rebuttable 
presumption that such a violent intragroup crime is not a hate crime but that hate 
crime legislation would be appropriate when there was strong evidence of group-
based animus and when the two subgroups are distinct enough such that the 
threat of communal victimization would be possible.  Arguably, when such a 
threat is lacking, it might be more likely that community policing and intragroup 
shaming could address the problem, making hate crime charges unnecessary in 
such situations.57 
  
56. Cases involving criminals other than rapists who target individuals based on gender could also 
qualify as violent, intergroup hate crimes.  For example, in 2006, Charles Carl Roberts IV drove to 
an Amish school, gun in hand, and after dismissing the boys, bound the remaining ten young girls 
together, shooting each of them and then killing himself.  Jon Rutter & Eric G. Stark, Dishwasher 
Turned Killer, LANCASTER ONLINE (Sept. 11, 2013, 7:33 PM), http://lancasteronline.com/ 
article/local/26564_Dishwasher-turned-killer.html.  This analysis could also apply in some 
domestic violence cases, though such cases are more nuanced as there is necessarily a prior 
relationship between the parties that makes symbolic victimization less likely.  For an examination 
of efforts to use antidiscrimination law to address domestic violence, see Sally F. Goldfarb, Applying 
the Discrimination Model to Violence Against Women: Some Reflections on Theory and Practice, 11 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 251 (2003). 
57. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 
230–33 (2004); Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and 
the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2222–28 (2001). 
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Finally, consider an intergroup crime in which the victim was targeted based 
on membership in a protected category but there was no evidence of bias or prej-
udice.58  For example, imagine a pickpocket who targets gay men because of her 
belief that they are more likely to carry large sums of money.  In this case, the 
pickpocket may have chosen her victims based on a protected characteristic, but 
there was no animus involved.  Moreover, while she may have chosen a gay victim 
because of a preconception about his sexuality, his sexual orientation was not in 
and of itself the reason for targeting but instead served as a proxy for “good tar-
get.”  This case lacks both animus and symbolic victimization, two of the three 
factors that comprise an archetypal hate crime.  As such, it more closely resembles 
a crime of opportunity than a hate crime. 
D. Academic Justifications 
Three strands of debate have dominated academic conversations about hate 
crime legislation: the statutes’ constitutionality, their conformity to established 
theories of criminal law, and their practical wisdom as instruments to root out bi-
as-motivated conduct.59  While some still contend that hate crime statutes are 
unconstitutional because of their impact on free expression,60 as a practical mat-
ter, the U.S. Supreme Court put this argument to rest in 1993 when it upheld 
Wisconsin’s penalty enhancement provision as consistent with First Amendment 
freedoms.61  Consequently, the most salient scholarly debates of the last twenty 
years have focused on the theoretical legitimacy and the practical wisdom of hate 
crime legislation.62 
  
58. See Cecil J. Hunt, II, In the Racial Crosshairs: Reconsidering Racially Targeted Predatory Lending 
Under a New Theory of Economic Hate Crime, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 211 (2003) (favoring the 
addition of a new category of “economic hate crime” to punish those found guilty of racialized 
predatory lending); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, The Thin Line Between Love and Hate: Why Affinity-
Based Securities and Investment Fraud Constitutes a Hate Crime, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1073 
(2003) (advocating the inclusion of affinity fraud—in which members of an identity group 
defraud other members of that same group—as a hate crime).  As most affinity fraud involves 
intragroup harm, such cases would not be characterized as archetypal hate crimes. 
59. Janine Young Kim, Hate Crime Law and the Limits of Inculpation, 84 NEB. L. REV. 846, 847 
(2006). 
60. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 23, at 128. 
61. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (upholding Wisconsin’s hate crime statute by 
unanimous vote).  For a discussion of the legal landscape immediately following the Wisconsin v. 
Mitchell decision, see Lawrence Crocker, Hate Crimes Statutes: Just? Constitutional? Wise?, 
1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 485. 
62. See LAWRENCE, supra note 49; Claudia Card, Is Penalty Enhancement a Sound Idea?, 20 LAW & 
PHIL. 195 (2001).  There are also constitutional debates about federal hate crime legislation related 
to the scope of federal power, but these are not relevant to individual state hate crime statutes.  See 
Frederick M. Lawrence, Federal Bias Crime Law Symposium, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1437, 1448 (2000). 
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This Part examines the principal theoretical groundings for hate crime 
laws—retributivism, utilitarianism, and expressivism—demonstrating that ex-
pressive theory encapsulates aspects of both retributive and utilitarian justifica-
tions.63  This expansive understanding of expressive theory explains its rhetorical 
dominance in debates on hate crime legislation. 
1. Retributivism 
Proponents of a retributivist approach contend that hate crime laws are jus-
tified if enhanced penalties are proportional,64 either corresponding to the great-
er wrongdoing that results from hate crimes themselves or to the offenders’ 
greater culpability due to their hate motives.65  The greater wrongdoing thesis 
posits that enhanced penalties for hate crime perpetrators are appropriate since 
hate crimes cause more severe physical and psychological injuries to principal 
victims, vicarious injuries to members of a victim’s identity group, and unique 
harms to society.66  Harm theorists point to preliminary evidence suggesting that 
hate crimes are more likely to involve physical assaults and greater physical injury 
to victims.67  They also focus on psychological trauma to the immediate victims, 
maintaining that hate crime victims, to a greater degree than victims of parallel 
non-hate motivated crimes, “tend to experience psychological symptoms such as 
depression or withdrawal, as well as anxiety, feelings of helplessness, and a pro-
  
63. Some scholars include expressivism as a subcategory of retribution.  See Carissa Byrne Hessick, 
Motive’s Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 89, 113 (2006).  I separate it out for 
expository purposes in order to highlight its role in the academic and legislative debates concerning 
hate crime legislation and to illustrate its relationship to both retributivism and utilitarianism. 
64. See ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 72–73 (3d ed. 2000); 
Hampton, supra note 12; Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in PRINCIPLED 
SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 110 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 3d 
ed. 2009). 
65. Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical Foundations of Bias Crime 
Statutes, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1015, 1024 (1997) (describing the “wrongdoing-culpability framework” 
as the central hypothesis of modern, retributive theory). 
66. For a detailed discussion and critique of the greater wrongdoing thesis, see Heidi M. Hurd & 
Michael S. Moore, Punishing Hatred and Prejudice, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (2004). 
67. LAWRENCE, supra note 49, at 39; see also JACK LEVIN & JACK MCDEVITT, HATE CRIMES: 
THE RISING TIDE OF BIGOTRY AND BLOODSHED 11 (1993) (noting that 30 percent of hate 
crime victims require hospital treatment, as compared to only 7 percent of the victims of parallel 
crimes, and that almost 75 percent of all hate-motivated assaults result in physical injury while only 
29 percent of all assault victims experience physical injury).  These statistics are based on an analysis 
of Boston police department records from 1983 through 1987.  Id.  While they could support the 
authors’ premise that “hate crimes are particularly violent,” the statistics could also indicate that only 
the more serious cases are likely to be identified as hate crimes.  Of course, simply because a crime 
has been identified as a hate crime does not necessarily mean it will be charged as such.  See infra 
Part II.B. 
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found sense of isolation.”68  They further point to collateral harms, claiming that 
members of a hate crime victim’s identity group “perceive that crime as an attack 
on themselves directly and individually.”69  Finally, harm theorists contend that 
hate crimes are more likely than parallel, non-hate-motivated crimes to “trigger 
chain reactions,” to cause a “breakdown in citizens’ sense of order and security,” 
and to “increase the polarization of a society.”70 
Those who focus on the culpability of the defendant suggest that a defend-
ant who is motivated by hatred is more culpable than one motivated by other 
emotions.71  The culpability thesis may be especially tempting to some because it 
is less vulnerable than the greater wrongdoer thesis to empirical disagreements 
about special harms.72  But some scholars contend that hate crime legislation is 
indefensible because it punishes on the basis of character rather than actions.73 
2. Utilitarianism 
While a retributivist approach seeks to punish offenders according to what 
they deserve for past wrongdoing, a utilitarian approach seeks to reduce future 
crimes.74  Central to a utilitarian framework are incapacitation and deterrence.75  
  
68. LAWRENCE, supra note 49, at 40. 
69. Id. at 41–42. 
70. Hurd & Moore, supra note 66, at 1091–92 (citing LAWRENCE, supra note 49, at 42–43; Weisburd 
& Levin, supra note 54, at 26–27). 
71. Recent psychological experiments lend support to the culpability thesis.  Nadine Recker Rayburn et 
al., Bystanders’ Perceptions of Perpetrators and Victims of Hate Crime: An Investigation Using the Person 
Perception Paradigm, 18 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1055, 1063 (2003) (finding that subjects 
“perceive[d] the perpetrators in the hate crime scenarios as more culpable” than those in otherwise 
identical, non-hate-motivated scenarios).  These findings help to explain the political feasibility of 
hate crime legislation.  Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Belief in a Just World, Blaming the Victim, and 
Hate Crime Statutes, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 311, 320 (2009) (“The public will tend to support hate 
crime enhancements because citizens view the hate motivation as making the perpetrator more 
culpable and therefore more deserving of punishment.”). 
72. Kim, supra note 59, at 893.   Critics, however, point to the necessity of shared norms (to determine 
who is more and less culpable) in order for the culpability thesis to have traction.  Id. 
73. Hurd & Moore, supra note 66, at 1095, 1129–30.  Hurd and Moore reject hate crime legislation 
for this reason.  For a general discussion of liberal conceptions of the Good versus the Right, see 
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).  See also Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, 
in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). 
74. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 454 (1997). 
75. Rehabilitation is also a component of utilitarianism but has not been used widely as a justification 
for hate crime legislation.  Some, however, have suggested that, given the young age of many hate 
crime offenders, rehabilitation may be possible in some cases.  See, e.g., Abraham Abramovsky, Bias 
Crime: Is Parental Liability the Answer?, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 533, 537; Jordan Blair 
Woods, Comment, Addressing Youth Bias Crime, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1899, 1904 (2009).  A few 
courts have included community service and tolerance training as part of sentencing.  See, e.g., Ed 
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Some in favor of hate crime laws have argued that hate crime offenders are par-
ticularly dangerous and therefore should be incapacitated longer than those who 
commit parallel crimes.76  In certain jurisdictions, conviction of a hate crime can 
be used by a judge to deny probation or parole.77 
Proponents of a utilitarian approach prioritize the creation of efficient be-
havioral incentives and would support a penalty enhancement based on hate mo-
tive if the defendant’s actions could be deterred.78  While no reliable empirics are 
available, utilitarian supporters of hate crime legislation claim that enhanced pen-
alties are warranted to counterbalance strong impulses motivated by animus and 
to impress on offenders and would-be offenders that their criminal actions will 
not go unnoticed.79 
Recent psychological findings that most individuals ascribe to a belief in a 
just world, or the just world bias, have been used to justify penalty enhance-
ments for hate crime perpetrators on utilitarian grounds.80  According to this 
understanding, individuals, because of their belief in a just world and in order to 
make sense of seemingly senseless violence, are prone to attributing negative 
characteristics to hate crime victims (blaming the victim, as it were).81  Doing so 
helps to restore one’s belief in a just world and serves to make the victim’s suf-
fering appear more deserved.  Scholars have argued that, in the hate crime con-
text, this may result in more crimes against other members of the victim group, 
perpetuating discrimination and even increasing overall rates of violence.82  The 
just world bias theory suggests that enacting hate crime legislation focuses at-
  
Stannard, Probation Given in Hate Crime, NEW HAVEN REG. (May 16, 2009, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/20090516/probation-given-in-hate-crime. 
76. LAWRENCE, supra note 49, at 62–63. 
77. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.031(3)–(4) (LexisNexis 2008) (“The finding that a hate 
crime was a primary factor in the commission of the crime . . . may be utilized by the sentencing 
judge as the sole factor for denial of probation . . . [and] may be utilized by the Parole Board in 
delaying or denying parole to a defendant.”). 
78. Tracey L. Meares et al., Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1175 (2004). 
79. Kahan, supra note 2, at 467.  Opponents argue that since, according to utilitarian principles, a 
penalty is useful only inasmuch as it deters social harms, if there is no evidence that hate crimes 
cause greater harm, there is also no utilitarian need for greater penalties.  See id. at 468.  Others 
reject a utilitarian justification for hate crime laws for different reasons, asserting that hate crime 
offenders, “the most alienated, hostile, and sociopathic members of society,” are unlikely to be 
deterred by the threat of criminal sanctions.  James B. Jacobs, Implementing Hate Crime Legislation 
Symbolism and Crime Control, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 541, 543. 
80. Dharmapala et al., supra note 71, at 315. 
81. See id. at 315–16. 
82. See id. at 333–34.  While further empirical study would be necessary to test this theory, the 
application of the just world bias to hate crimes is particularly disturbing and could support 
consideration of increased penalties to counterbalance this tendency to blame the victim and, by 
extension, the victim’s group. 
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tention on the culpability of the perpetrator and forces observers to revise their 
negative beliefs about the victim and the victim’s group, thus deterring other 
would-be offenders.83 
3. Expressivism 
Expressive theory, which highlights the influence of law on social 
norms,84 contains strands of both retributivism and utilitarianism and has been 
a popular academic justification for hate crime legislation.85  Expressivist argu-
ments that sound in retributivism focus on countering morally blameworthy 
messages with positive ones.86  By enacting hate crime laws, legislators signal 
that perpetrators of hate crimes are more culpable than those who commit par-
allel crimes and that hate crimes result in greater social harm than do crimes 
that are not motivated by bias.87 
While some scholars discuss expressivism as a subcategory of retributiv-
ism,88 many modern expressivist arguments are actually utilitarian, focusing on 
changing social norms and behavior through the persuasive and acculturating 
force of law.89  Social norm theorists posit that, since laws express the values of a 
  
83. See id. at 334.  While, arguably, this rationale could be used to support all criminal punishment, 
hate crimes could be understood as unique inasmuch as they blur the line between the victim and 
the victim’s identity group.  Thus, whereas if X robs Y, one might be inclined to blame Y for being 
in the wrong place at the wrong time or to fathom another reason why Y deserved what he got, if X 
assaults Y because of a protected characteristic, one might be inclined to believe not only that Y 
deserved what he got but also that other identity group members deserve similar treatment. 
84. For an explanation and defense of expressive theories of law, see Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard 
H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV 1503, 1531–64 
(2000).  For a general critique of the norms school and its application to criminal law, see Robert 
Weisberg, Norms and Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 467 (2003). 
85. See supra note 2.  This Article focuses on expressivism as the dominant justification for hate 
crime legislation not as a normative matter but as a descriptive one.  The Article examines 
hate crime legislation on the same terms set out by legislators who have enacted the laws in 
order to explore how the intended message of enactment relates to or is undermined by the 
enforcement of hate crime laws.  The Article thus focuses not on whether expressive 
aspirations of legislators are justifiable but on whether, assuming that legislators do have 
expressive aspirations, such aspirations are met and, if not, why not. 
86. See generally FEINBERG, supra note 12, at 95. 
87. This self-conscious signaling is arguably the value-add of expressive theory and what distinguishes 
it from a retributive account. 
88. See Hessick, supra note 63. 
89. In fact, some critics of expressive theory argue that expressivism overlaps so much with 
utilitarianism that it does not deserve distinction as an independent theory.  See, e.g., Heidi M. 
Hurd, Expressing Doubts About Expressivism, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405, 429 (“[T]he expressivist 
promised more.  He promised us a theory of punishment independent of the traditional theories of 
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society,90 the enactment of hate crime legislation demonstrates the existence of a 
consensus denouncing hate crimes and supporting tolerance and pluralism.91  
Hate crime legislation is therefore understood to send a message to society rather 
than only to specific offenders or would-be offenders.92  It is this self-conscious 
desire to “send a message,” along with the notably transparent rhetoric that ac-
companies it, that distinguishes expressive theory from the conventional under-
standing of utilitarianism. 
Proponents of hate crime legislation have argued that if a perpetrator sends 
a message of hatred to the victim and the victim’s group, the state in turn should 
send a message that such hatred is not acceptable in our pluralistic society.  Dan 
Kahan refers to this veritable “call and response” as a dialogue between crime and 
punishment.93  The defendant, through the commission of a hate crime, speaks, 
and society, through punishing the defendant’s actions with an enhanced penalty, 
responds.94  According to expressive theory, when a prosecutor adds a hate crime 
charge in an archetypal hate crime case, she may be said to send messages to the 
defendant, to the victim and the victim’s identity group, and to society.  An 
expressivist account identifies the message to the defendant as one of stigma and 
denunciation, to the victim and victim’s group as one of valuation, and to society 
as one of a commitment to tolerance and equality.  By contrast, expressive theory 
suggests that when a prosecutor opts against adding a hate crime charge despite 
substantial evidence of bias motive, the opposite expressive message is sent.95 
  
punishment, and thus independent of claims that it will be an effective means of advancing the 
utilitarian’s agenda.”). 
90. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective From the Legal 
Academy, in SOCIAL NORMS 35 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001). 
91. Cf. McAdams, supra note 1, at 364–65. 
92. Beale, supra note 2, at 1254–55; see also Jacobs, supra note 79, at 545–47. 
93. Kahan, supra note 2, at 463. 
94. Opponents of hate crime legislation also draw on expressive language.  They respond that 
punishing hate crime perpetrators with enhanced penalties sends a message that victims of other 
non-hate-related crimes matter less in the eyes of the law.  Id. at 466.  Critics also maintain that 
hate crime legislation criminalizes certain beliefs; for example, if crimes motivated by antigay 
animus result in heightened punishment, this may be seen to criminalize so-called “pro-family” 
beliefs.  James Brooke, Gay Man Dies From Attack, Fanning Outrage and Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
13, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/13/us/gay-man-dies-from-attack-fanning-outrage-
and-debate.html (quoting Steven A. Schwalm of the Family Research Council). 
95. Expressive theory suggests that, especially in archetypal hate crime cases, nonenforcement can 
negate the expressive message of hate crime legislation.  Instead of feeling valued and protected, 
hate crime victims and their identity group members may believe (with good reason) that the 
legislation is merely symbolic, designed as a means of legislative catharsis but without any bite.  Or 
worse, identity group members may perceive not merely a general lack of hate crime enforcement 
but, specifically, a problem of biased enforcement that disparately impacts their identity group.  For 
a discussion of the possibility that selective enforcement of hate crimes might result in the 
unintended consequence of a disparate impact on minorities, see Martha Minow, Regulating 
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In 1999, Kahan speculated that, as the hate crime legislation debate pro-
gressed, expressivist arguments would fall into disfavor and more empirically 
grounded deterrence arguments would gain traction among legislators and 
others.96  He claimed that, because it is a comparatively young debate, “[b]oth 
sides continue to speak in an unselfconscious expressive idiom that makes their 
true motivations transparent,”97 but suggested that, over time, “participants in 
the hate crime debate [will] recoil from the cultural tension that expressive 
claims reveal,” and deterrence arguments will become more widespread.98  De-
spite Kahan’s predictions, however, the legislation’s proponents have contin-
ued unabashedly to speak in expressive terms through the present day.99 
As expressive rhetoric permeates academic and legislative discourse about 
hate crime legislation, it also provides a baseline from which to examine hate 
crime enforcement.  While a rich scholarly debate has examined what messages 
are sent and to whom at the moment of hate crime law enactment, the messaging 
function of enforcement remains comparatively neglected.  Part II looks to the 
facts on the ground in order to examine enforcement practices and to draw pre-
liminary conclusions about how legislative messaging may be affected or even 
undermined by hate crime enforcement.100 
II. THE ENFORCEMENT OF HATE CRIME LEGISLATION 
This Part focuses on the institutional incentives that influence prosecutorial 
charging decisions, documenting the tensions between promulgation and en-
forcement of hate crime legislation.  As the district attorney’s charging decision is 
generally the first public pronouncement of how the criminal justice system re-
gards a particular crime, the Article will focus on this aspect of enforcement and 
nonenforcement, drawing on firsthand accounts of prosecutors to supplement 
  
Hatred: Whose Speech, Whose Crimes, Whose Power?—An Essay for Kenneth Karst, 47 UCLA L. REV. 
1253, 1258 (2000). 
96. Kahan, supra note 2, at 474–76 (maintaining that deterrence arguments should appeal to those 
citizens who feel dispassionately about hate crime legislation, to those who detest a public debate 
that involves moralizing, and to the “strategically sophisticated” supporters of the legislation). 
97. Id. at 463. 
98. Id. 
99. See Hurd & Moore, supra note 66, at 1111 (“Of all the purported justifications . . . , this claim that 
hate/bias crime legislation sends a message to counteract the message of hate/bias-motivated 
offenders seems to be the justification that most persuades proponents of such legislation.”); supra 
Part I.B. 
100. Notably, an inquiry into the realities of hate crime enforcement is also crucial to determining 
whether utilitarian and retributivist goals are being met.  But this discussion is outside the focus of 
this Article. 
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the theoretical discussion of statutory, political, and other factors involved in 
charging decisions. 
Preliminary results suggest that, whether intentionally or not, prosecutors 
send expressive messages through their charging decisions and that hate crime 
legislation in practice may undermine the messages sent by hate crime law en-
actment.101  Despite the enthusiasm with which interest groups and other propo-
nents have celebrated the enactment of hate crime legislation, the practical results 
of hate crime laws have been mixed.  In archetypal hate crime cases involving in-
tergroup, identity-based animus, prosecutors may opt against adding hate crime 
charges because of statutory incentives, concerns about jury reaction, or other po-
litical or historical factors.  In non-bias-motivated cases, prosecutors may add du-
bious hate crime charges in an effort to assert their leverage at the plea-bargaining 
stage.  This discrepancy is striking because of its effects both on the morale of 
those interest groups that have prioritized the enactment of these laws, and on 
public perception of the worth and viability of hate crime legislation. 
A. The Qualitative Study 
To better understand the incentives that influence prosecutorial charging 
decisions, I conducted a set of interviews with fifty-two prosecutors in twenty-
four jurisdictions across the country102 asking them about the statutory factors 
that influence their charging decisions as well as the role of cultural and regional 
factors.  While some statistical information is available in the form of Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) statistics and voluntary state and district reports, 
many offices do not publish detailed information on hate crime charging, mak-
ing conversations with individual prosecutors about the practices and policies of 
their respective offices a necessary supplement.103  These interviews represent 
  
101. See infra Part II.D. 
102. These jurisdictions include Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of 
Columbia, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Washington.  These confidential interviews with prosecutors are 
numbered 1–52 in order to preserve their anonymity. 
103. I used semistructured interviews as a means to explore prosecutorial charging decisions.  While I 
developed an outline of topics to be discussed in each interview, I did not follow a fixed script.  
Rather, the outline organized the interview and allowed me the flexibility to ask follow-up 
questions when appropriate.  For examples of this technique in the law review literature, see 
Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal Criminal Courts: An 
Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 
92 CALIF. L. REV. 425, 436 (2004); Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning 
Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 742–43 (2002); Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo 
and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 309, 318 (2004); Angela Littwin, Beyond 
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the first scholarly inquiry into the details of hate crime prosecution across a 
broad range of jurisdictions.104 
Given the dearth of hate crime prosecutions generally,105 I limited my inter-
views to prosecutors from offices in urban, metropolitan districts with popula-
tions of at least 200,000 people.106  I selected a variety of offices based on size, 
region of the country, and type of hate crime statute in order to collect contrasting 
examples to illustrate the range of factors that might affect prosecutors when 
faced with a hate crime case.  In offices that included designated individuals who 
oversaw hate crime cases, whether as part of a hate crime unit or not, I inter-
viewed prosecutors who were in charge of hate crime enforcement efforts.  In of-
fices that did not have such designated individuals, I spoke to line prosecutors 
who had been working in the office for at least five years in order to get a sense of 
how the office dealt with hate crime cases over time.  In some instances, a prose-
cutor from one office provided a name of someone in another office who had 
dealt with hate crime cases.  My interviews thus involved a combination of prese-
lecting offices based on statutory and geographic diversity and using a snowball 
approach.107  In the interviews, prosecutors discussed the various dynamics that 
influenced their charging decisions in both archetypal and nonarchetypal cases.108  
The most salient factors affecting hate crime prosecution to emerge during our 
  
Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference Among Low Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
451, 456–57 (2008); Mark C. Miller, A Legislative Perspective on the Ohio, Massachusetts, and 
Federal Courts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 235, 240 n.25 (1995); Jacqueline E. Ross, Undercover Policing and 
the Shifting Terms of Scholarly Debate: The United States and Europe in Counterpoint, 4 ANN. REV. L. 
& SOC. SCI. 239 (2008).  For examples in the social science literature, see infra note 287. 
104. See supra note 11. 
105. See infra Part II.B.  Since many offices do not keep records of hate crime charges, there are no 
statistics available indicating how many hate crimes are prosecuted per year in the United States.  
Valerie Jenness, Hate Crimes, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 
524, 538 (Michael Tonry ed., 2009).  A Department of Justice report, however, confirmed that 
“only 20 percent of reported hate crimes result in arrest,” suggesting that underreporting concerns 
would be exacerbated at the charging stage.  Hearing, supra note 15, at 13.  Furthermore, out of 
over 2000 respondents to a survey of chief prosecutors in state court systems about what felonies 
their offices prosecute, 72.2 percent indicated that their offices did not prosecute any hate crime 
cases (another 9.6 percent reported “missing data”).  Jenness, supra, at 539.  Of all the felony crimes 
listed, only “telemarketing fraud” and “excessive police force” received a lower percentage of offices 
that prosecuted the crimes.  Id. 
106. These offices, by virtue of their larger size, are also in a position to affect more people. 
107. For general information on snowball sampling techniques, see Douglas D. Heckathorn, 
Respondent-Driven Sampling: A New Approach to the Study of Hidden Populations, 44 SOC. PROBS. 
174 (1997). 
108. For further details about how the semistructured interviews were conducted, see infra Appendix I: 
Qualitative Methodology. 
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discussions included police underreporting, statutory language, and concerns 
about appealing to a jury.109 
This study is purely qualitative, and I do not claim that the prosecutors se-
lected are a representative sample of all U.S. prosecutors.  But these results do go 
beyond case studies from one or two jurisdictions, and I supplemented them by 
interviewing interest group leaders whose work involves combating hate crimes 
nationwide.110  I interviewed prosecutors from a variety of jurisdictions that used 
different kinds of hate crime laws and faced differing resource constraints.  The 
commonalities seen in many of their responses, notwithstanding these underly-
ing differences, suggest themes that may be fairly widespread in the prosecution 
of hate crimes.111 
B. Nonenforcement in Archetypal Cases 
1. Underreporting of Hate Crimes 
By the year 2000, 12,000 law enforcement agencies in all fifty states partici-
pated in hate crime data collection.112  Strikingly, 80 percent of reporting agencies 
routinely reported no hate crimes.113  In 2010, for example, cities reporting no 
hate crimes included Miami, FL, Newark, NJ, and New Orleans, LA.  Cities 
that did not report at all in 2010 included Louisville, KY, Toledo, OH, and 
Honolulu, HI.114 
  
109. Of course, there is no guarantee that the information provided by prosecutors with whom I spoke is 
an accurate representation, even of their own experiences.  But each interviewee was informed that 
our interview would be anonymous, and given that many spoke critically about their offices and 
charging policies, I did not have reason to doubt the accuracy of any statements included in this 
Article.  Additionally, the experiences chronicled were diverse enough that the prosecutors did not 
seem to be speaking according to script but instead appeared to be thoughtfully considering the 
questions I posed and engaging with them openly and honestly in light of their experiences. 
110. These confidential interviews are labeled A–N.  Interest group leaders’ perspectives provided a 
useful counterpoint to the prosecutors’ accounts.  See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 11, at 47 
(“[The] use of multiple approaches to hone in on a problem from a number of directions is known 
as a process of converging operations or triangulation.” (emphasis omitted)). 
111. Interviewing a range of prosecutors helps to illuminate regional and cultural differences between 
offices and to make the study more robust.  See generally id.; ROBERT S. WEISS, LEARNING 
FROM STRANGERS: THE ART AND METHOD OF QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW STUDIES 
(1994). 
112. Valerie Jenness, The Emergence, Content, and Institutionalization of Hate Crime Law: How a Diverse 
Policy Community Produced a Modern Legal Fact, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 141, 146 (2007).  
Jurisdictions included in the Uniform Crime Reports contain more than 85 percent of the U.S. 
population.  Id. 
113. Jenness, supra note 105, at 533. 
114. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, COMPILATION OF FBI HATE CRIME STATISTICS ACT 
DID NOT REPORT (DNR) AND ZERO REPORTING (Nov. 2011) (on file with author). 
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The number of reported hate crimes varies widely depending on the source, 
making it extremely difficult to identify reliable data on hate crime incidents.  
Nonetheless, research suggests that hate crimes are underreported both by vic-
tims to police and by individual law enforcement agencies to the FBI, leading to 
FBI statistics that drastically understate the prevalence of hate crimes nationally. 
For example, the National Crime Victimization Survey recently reported an 
average of 210,000 hate crime victims annually based on victim reports.115  Yet re-
search suggests that only 40 percent of hate crimes generally and about 10 percent 
of hate crimes motivated by bias against gay, lesbian, and transgendered victims 
specifically are reported to police.116  Indeed, some victim groups may be especial-
ly afraid of law enforcement and therefore unlikely to report a hate crime against a 
member of their group.117 
Moreover, research suggests that there is a notable discrepancy between the 
number of hate crimes reported to police and the number of hate crimes reported 
by law enforcement agencies to the FBI.118  The FBI bases its statistics on infor-
  
115. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 
209911, HATE CRIME REPORTED BY VICTIMS AND POLICE 1 (2005).  The National Crime 
Victimization Survey data are obtained from a representative sample of approximately 90,000 
households (nearly 160,000 persons).  Id. 
116. GLEN KERCHER ET AL., CRIME VICTIMS’ INST., HATE CRIMES 18 (2008); LYNN LANGTON 
& MICHAEL PLANTY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 
234085, HATE CRIME, 2003–2009, at 6 (2011).  These numbers suggest that hate crime reporting 
is as low as or even lower than sexual assault reporting, long considered one of the most 
underreported crimes.  See Reporting Rates, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK, 
http://www.rainn.org/get-information/statistics/reporting-rates (last visited Feb. 15, 2014) 
(suggesting that only 40 percent of sexual assaults are reported to the police).  Of course, 
victimization surveys and crime reports will never be perfectly consistent: Just as different 
understandings of what constitutes consent (or lack thereof) will affect reporting in the sexual 
assault context, different understandings of what constitutes a hate crime will yield disparate 
numbers in surveys and other reports in the hate crime context.  Thus, people could question claims 
of underreporting of hate crimes, as scholars have done with rape.  See, e.g., Neil Gilbert, Realities 
and Mythologies of Rape, 29 SOCIETY 4 (1992) (highlighting a discrepancy between how a 
researcher defined rape and how women characterized their own experiences).  Certain factors, 
however, such as the lack of mandatory reporting by police, suggest that the FBI statistics may 
drastically underestimate hate crime numbers regardless of these definitional problems. 
117. NAT’L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, HATE VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY, 
BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, QUEER, AND HIV-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES IN 2011, at 8 (2012).  One Washington prosecutor explained, “[T]he transgendered 
community is particularly fearful of law enforcement, just like immigrants and some ethnic 
minorities.”  Interview 5. 
118. Of course, aside from suggesting underreporting by law enforcement, this discrepancy could also 
suggest overreporting by victims.  Even assuming, however, that victims may have an overly 
expansive understanding of what constitutes a hate crime, these numbers (along with the fact that 
80 percent of law enforcement agencies do not report any hate crimes), Jenness, supra note 105, at 
533, suggest that there is a significant amount of underreporting by law enforcement.  Additionally, 
if large numbers of victims who report hate crimes actually misunderstand the legal parameters for a 
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mation submitted by law enforcement agencies throughout the nation, and 
therefore they are dependent on the individual agencies’ compliance with report-
ing requirements.119  In recent years, the FBI reported approximately 7000 hate 
crimes per year,120 fewer than 5 percent of hate crimes reported by victims. 
Even when a victim reports a hate crime and police get involved, the case 
may never be investigated as a hate crime if a bias motive is not flagged by po-
lice.121  Many prosecutors acknowledged that hate crime legislation was likely 
underused and attributed this phenomenon to a lack of police awareness about 
hate crime statutes.122  In most jurisdictions, police are the first movers when it 
comes to hate crime charges, and they are expected to suggest what charges pros-
ecutors should file.  Many prosecutors agreed, “If police don’t flag a motive, it will 
likely go unnoticed.”123 
Police reporting methods vary by jurisdiction, and three different ap-
proaches emerged from the interviews.  In some offices, a special police unit or 
task force exists to combat hate crimes, and in these offices, police in the desig-
nated unit are expected to investigate and report a possible bias motive.124  Other 
offices may not have a special task force but expect police to check a box on their 
reporting forms to indicate possible bias motive.  Finally, in some offices, no 
such box exists on the police form and all judgments about the existence and 
  
hate crime charge, that would raise doubts about how effective expressive aims of the legislation can 
be if misunderstood by so many victims. 
119. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HATE CRIME STATISTICS 2004, at 1 (2005), 
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2004/tables/HateCrime2004.pdf. 
120. See Comparison of FBI Hate Crime Statistics (2011–2000), ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, 
http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/FBI-HCSA-2011-2000-Comparison.pdf (last 
updated Dec. 2012). 
121. For an examination of hate crime policing on the ground, including a discussion of structural, 
institutional, and demographic factors that dissuade police officers from enforcing hate crimes, see 
JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED: LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND HATE 
CRIME (2002). 
122. See, e.g., Interviews 3, 7, 9.  This view corroborates studies of police departments suggesting that, 
unless there are specific departmental policies regarding hate crime enforcement and these policies 
are part of routine police training, police officers are unlikely to report possible hate motives.  See, 
e.g., Jennifer Balboni & Jack McDevitt, Hate Crime Reporting: Understanding Police Officer 
Perceptions, Departmental Protocol, and the Role of the Victim: Is There Such a Thing as a “Love” Crime?, 
3 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 1 (2001). 
123. Forty-six of fifty-two prosecutors speculated that if police did not flag evidence of bias, prosecutors 
in their jurisdiction would likely not notice a bias motive.  A few, however, mentioned that even if 
police neglect to flag bias cases, evidence of bias sometimes emerges during the process of 
interviewing witnesses and the victim.  One prosecutor explained, “I meet with the victim in each 
case to hear their story.  If they explain that there’s a bias factor, we might follow up.”  Interview 14. 
124. Studies of hate crime policing have suggested that when a police department includes a specialized 
hate crime task force or bias unit, police officers are more likely to report and investigate possible 
hate motives.  See Balboni & McDevitt, supra note 122, at 23. 
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prosecution of bias motives are deferred to prosecutors.  Notwithstanding these 
distinctions among police departments, prosecutors across the board speculated 
that hate crimes were significantly underreported by police.125 
In a few large cities (such as Boston and New York City), an entire task 
force or police unit is devoted to hate crimes.  For example, the New York City 
Police Department Hate Crime Task Force receives notice if a police department 
duty captain determines that the facts of a case appear to include a bias motive, 
and this triggers a Hate Crime Task Force investigation.126  But local prosecutors 
explained that even in New York and other larger cities with task forces dedicated 
to investigating possible hate crimes: “[W]here there’s a vicious assault, deter-
mining motive isn’t always a top priority for police; their key objective is to identi-
fy the perpetrator.  They’re not focused on the hate crime aspect.”127 
Few jurisdictions have police officers whose jobs are focused solely on inves-
tigating possible hate crimes.  What differentiates the remaining jurisdictions is 
whether police are trained to recognize hate crimes and, if so, how they com-
municate a possible bias motive to the prosecutor.  Of special importance is 
whether police are prompted to answer questions about motive on police report 
forms and whether they are instructed to flag cases according to expansive or nar-
row parameters.128 
Among those prosecutors who expressed concern that archetypal hate 
crime cases often were not flagged as such, many highlighted the existence of a 
“possible bias motive” box on police report forms as the best way for police to 
flag possible hate crimes.129  In D.C., for example, “law enforcement flags any 
interaction with a civilian that raises a hate crime flag.  They’re flagged if poten-
tially a hate crime.  The intention is to catch anything that raises issues.”130  
Nonetheless, even prosecutors in jurisdictions that include a “possible bias mo-
tive” box on their police forms still assumed that many hate crime cases fall un-
der the radar because police are “under tremendous pressure” and “preoccupied 
with other aspects of the crime scene.”131 
  
125. Forty-nine of fifty-two prosecutors mentioned that they believed police significantly underreport hate 
crimes.  Interest groups leaders also repeatedly mentioned police underreporting.  Interviews A–E. 
126. Interview 28. 
127. Interviews 27, 28, 30. 
128. Interviews 15, 24, 31. 
129. For example, in some states, such as Michigan, police fill out a form that includes the question 
whether or not there was a possible ethnic intimidation motive and boxes to check labeled “yes” and 
“no.”  Interviews 7, 9, 14. 
130. Interview 31. 
131. Interviews 5, 6, 9.  Many prosecutors emphasized that police are not to blame, as their responsibilities 
are vast and they are under tremendous pressure; one prosecutor maintained that being a cop in his 
notoriously crime-ridden city is the “toughest job in the state.”  Interview 14. 
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While police reporting may be unreliable even in jurisdictions where routine 
forms include a “possible bias” box, in jurisdictions that lack such a box, prosecu-
tors reported that police almost certainly will not flag the defendant’s motive.  In 
states where there are no boxes to check for possible bias motive, many prosecutors 
indicated that “we don’t see it charged by police,” observing this as an anomaly 
since, in areas other than hate crimes, “officers tend to overcharge.”132 
Some prosecutors theorized that police may resent what they perceive as 
special rights for minorities and, consequently, police may not be inclined to flag 
a possible bias motive.133  Research also suggests that police officers nationwide 
are more likely to classify a crime as bias motivated when people of color are the 
offenders than when people of color are the victims or survivors.134 
2. Statutory Influences on Charging Decisions 
The vast theoretical literature on prosecutorial incentives suggests that 
among the factors that motivate prosecutors are a desire to win cases, to realize 
personal political gains, to process cases efficiently, to promote fairness, and to 
deter crime.135  Conversations with prosecutors often touched on the relationship 
between these general incentives and the likelihood that a prosecutor would pur-
sue hate crime charges in a particular case.136  Prosecutors noted the conflict that 
  
132. A few prosecutors were uncertain if there was any box to check indicating possible bias motive.  
Interviews 2, 36.  One considered whether prosecutors would even look for signs of motive if there 
was such a box and police had checked it, resolving, “It’s doubtful; I know I don’t.”  Interview 18. 
133. Interviews 1, 29. 
134. NAT’L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, HATE VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY, 
BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, QUEER AND HIV-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES IN 2010, at 22 (2011).  This finding holds true even within the gay, lesbian, and 
transgendered communities.  According to a 2010 report about hate violence against members of the 
gay, lesbian, and transgendered communities, “[p]olice refused bias classification to 25% of survivors 
and victims of color as compared to 25% of white people in hate violence incidents that were 
reported to police.”  Id.  These statistics could be a result of misclassification by victims, or they could 
indicate selective enforcement of hate crime statutes.  See supra note 118. 
135. See, e.g. Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97 GEO. L.J. 
1509, 1524–30 (2009) (describing hypothetical prosecutors, each of whom values one of these 
factors as paramount).  For examples of empirical studies that test these theoretical models, see 
Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize?: An Analysis of the Federalization of Drug 
Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259 (2000); Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial 
Agenda Setting in United States Attorneys’ Offices: The Role of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants, 23 
JUST. SYS. J. 271 (2002); see also Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors for Performance, 6 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 441 (2009); Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea 
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183 (2007); Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, The 
Political Economy of Prosecution, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 135 (2009). 
136. The interviewees were limited to line prosecutors and did not include any elected district attorneys.  
Unlike line prosecutors, elected district attorneys are subject to some of the same electoral pressures 
as legislators and may want to curry favor with the same contingents.  Further research would be 
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might emerge between these factors, for example, when a desire for justice in 
prosecuting a hate crime might run counter to a desire for efficiency or the desire 
to win.  These conflicts may be at least partially responsible for the dearth of hate 
crime prosecutions nationally. 
Official data on hate crime prosecution are derived from reports by the U.S. 
Department of Justice, state attorneys general, and the National Prosecutors Sur-
vey.137  While most district attorney offices do not keep records about the disposi-
tion of hate crimes (such as the number of cases that have been reported, charged, 
pled, and tried),138 studies that have examined these numbers in individual offices 
suggest that only a minuscule percentage of hate crime cases reported are actually 
charged as such by prosecutors.139 
Indeed, even in cases flagged by police for possible bias motive, an exami-
nation of prosecutorial incentives reveals that in many archetypal hate crime cas-
es a prosecutor has no incentive to include hate crime charges, and may even 
have incentives not to do so.  A prosecutor’s charging decision is subject to a bal-
ancing of incentives, and if the burden of proving a hate crime charge outweighs 
the possible benefit, a prosecutor has no incentive to use hate crime legislation.  
The language of a hate crime statute and its statutory context (the way the stat-
ute interfaces with other criminal statutes) may preclude its use in many arche-
typal hate crime cases. 
State hate crime statutes either serve as a penalty enhancement, adding onto 
the penalty associated with the underlying offense by a specified amount when a 
prosecutor proves a bias motive, or they create a separate standalone offense for 
bias motive.  Even within these two categories, however, there is tremendous var-
iation between states with respect to how hate crime charges could actually affect 
a defendant’s sentence.  In the interviews, prosecutors across jurisdictions refer-
  
necessary to explore the degree to which interest groups may exert pressure on elected district 
attorneys to enforce hate crime statutes in certain cases and to what degree (and under what 
circumstances) these tactics might be successful. 
137. Jenness, supra note 105, at 537–38. 
138. Hate crime data is not unique in this regard, and other scholars have lamented the unavailability of 
information on case dispositions in criminal law generally.  See, e.g., Marc L. Miller & Samantha 
Caplinger, Prosecution in Arizona: Practical Problems, Prosecutorial Accountability, and Local Solutions, 
41 CRIME & JUST. 265, 266 (2012). 
139. See, e.g., Eric Dexheimer, Texas Hate Crime Law Has Little Effect, STATESMAN (Jan. 24, 2012, 
9:56 AM), http://www.statesman.com/news/statesman-investigates/texas-hate-crime-law-has-
little-effect-2116587.html (documenting the last decade of hate crime prosecutions in Texas, 
where approximately 2000 bias-motivated crimes were reported—about 200 per year—and only 
ten defendants were convicted under the statute, with all but one as part of a plea agreement).  
California is a rare exception, both in terms of data collection and hate crime prosecution.  In 2006, 
of the 363 hate crime cases referred to prosecutors, 272 were filed as hate crimes and 140 resulted in 
hate crime convictions.  Jenness, supra note 105, at 540. 
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enced the particular language of their state’s statute as the most salient factor in 
determining whether they were inclined to add hate crime charges in a given 
case.140  While most prosecutors did not mention expressive concerns as influen-
tial when determining whether to add a hate crime charge, a few suggested that 
any expressive message intended by the legislators would be ineffective if not ac-
companied by increased punishment to demonstrate that the state was serious in 
its proclaimed efforts to combat hate violence.141 
An examination of some of these statutory variations is crucial to under-
standing why some prosecutors may not have an incentive to include hate crime 
charges in archetypal cases.  For example, in a penalty enhancement state, a pros-
ecutor might not have sufficient incentive to include a hate crime charge if proof 
of a bias motive would not elevate the crime to the next level of punishment.  
Some prosecutors noted that a hate crime charge was simply not worth their time 
if it would not be accompanied by increased punishment.142 
Consider the distinction between four categories of offenses: misdemean-
ors, non-life-sentence-eligible felonies, life-sentence-eligible felonies, and capi-
tal crimes.  Within the categories of misdemeanor and felony, one might expect 
that prosecutors would have an incentive to add hate crime charges when doing 
so could elevate the offense, for example, from a class B misdemeanor to a class 
A misdemeanor.  One might further expect that extra incentives would attach 
when a hate crime charge could elevate an offense from one category to the next, 
such as from a misdemeanor to a felony.  Indeed, while statutory schemes are 
highly variable across states, a critical factor in determining whether to include a 
penalty enhancement charge may be whether or not it could elevate an offense to 
the next level.143 
Where a statute does not allow for such elevation of an offense, one still 
might expect that prosecutors, in order to encourage a longer sentence from a 
judge, would include a hate crime charge if it would increase the minimum 
  
140. This factor was the most salient for prosecutors, even across cultural, historical, and regional 
differences. 
141. Interviews 25, 41, 46. 
142. Interviews 4, 13, 16, 19, 50. 
143. One exception to the intuition that a prosecutor is most likely to include a hate crime charge when 
it could elevate an offense to a higher category is in the case of death penalty eligible cases.  While 
the possibility of elevating a sentence from life in prison to the death penalty might seem 
particularly significant, in practice prosecutors rarely rely on hate crime enhancements to do so.  
Especially in a capital case, “Once you’re looking at first- or second-degree murder, the hate crime 
enhancements are incidental.  There are many aggravating factors you could use instead.”  
Interview 25.  Thus, in particularly violent archetypal cases, prosecutors may be least likely to 
include hate crime charges, as they will have an incentive to rely instead on other aggravating 
factors that do not require proof of motive. 
890 61 UCLA L. REV. 858 (2014) 
 
 
penalty.  But many prosecutors referenced the tendency of judges in their juris-
dictions to impose such high sentences that the assumption of an extra legal bur-
den was simply not worth it.144  When asked for further clarification, none of the 
prosecutors expressed concern that judges in their jurisdiction meted out overly 
harsh sentences; instead, prosecutors clarified that the sentences seemed ample 
without a hate crime enhancement and, therefore, that it was not worth expend-
ing additional resources to pursue a hate crime conviction.145 
In jurisdictions where the statute specifies that hate crime charges cannot 
increase a sentence when a crime is already classified at the highest misdemeanor 
or felony level, prosecutors have little incentive to use the legislation when prose-
cuting class A misdemeanors or first-degree felonies.  In Texas, for example, 
prosecutors explained that “if you have a second-degree aggravated assault, then it 
may make sense as it would raise the charge to a first-degree assault; if it’s already 
a first-degree felony or class A misdemeanor, there’s no sense to add a hate crime 
charge.”146 
Prosecutors from other jurisdictions with similar statutory schemes agreed 
that to add a hate crime charge under such circumstances would be pointless or ill 
advised, explaining, “[H]ate crime charges wouldn’t give us more, and aren’t 
worth the time in such cases.”147  The alignment of incentives in such cases may 
point toward underuse of hate crime legislation in cases involving bias motive in 
which, even if proven, there would be no substantive difference in a defendant’s 
sentence.  But hate crime legislation may be used for other purposes, such as a 
way to introduce motive evidence.  According to a prosecutor in Los Angeles 
County’s Hate Crime Unit, “We don’t need the hate crime charge to get the 
death penalty or a conviction, but it’s a good way to get motive evidence in to the 
jury.”148  Prosecutors in Model Penal Code states, however, noted that since all 
facts and circumstances go into the punishment phase there is little use for hate 
crime legislation in their jurisdictions.149 
In states where hate crimes constitute standalone substantive crimes, a 
prosecutor has no incentive to include hate crime charges if there is a higher 
  
144. See, e.g., Interviews 4, 10, 11, 16, 46. 
145. See, e.g., Interviews 10, 11.  Prosecutors also expressed concern about jury reaction.  See infra Part 
II.B.3. 
146. Interviews 4, 16.  Notably, Texas’s hate crime statute effectively “excludes most serious crimes 
because the range of punishment already goes up to 99 years in prison.”  Dexheimer, supra note 
139.  While a hate crime finding could nonetheless raise the defendant’s minimum sentence, no 
prosecutor with whom I spoke considered this effect a sufficient incentive to justify assuming the 
extra burden of proving motive in such a case. 
147. Interviews 4, 8, 16. 
148. Interview 24. 
149. See, e.g., Interview 16. 
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charge that does not require proof of motive.  In standalone hate crime jurisdic-
tions, conviction on a hate crime charge may yield a few months or even a few 
years in prison.150  Prosecutors in states with standalone hate crime statutes, 
which generally carry a sentence of two years or less, often questioned the utility 
of hate crime legislation for assault cases, noting that “you’re always going to 
charge the highest offense, and different assault statutes carry lots of time.”151  
Many echoed the observation that “often where there’s evidence of ethnic intim-
idation, there’s also a violent assault, and therefore a more serious charge.  And 
where there’s strong evidence of a serious assault, the hate crime component is 
less compelling and we’re more likely to charge without ethnic intimidation.”152  
Whereas conventional accounts of plea bargaining suggest that prosecutors are 
liable to throw in extra charges in order to gain leverage at the plea-bargaining 
stage,153 this was not a common refrain among prosecutors with respect to hate 
crime charges.154  Rather, in penalty enhancement and standalone states alike, 
prosecutors explained that, even without considering hate crime charges, they 
had many other statutes and enhancements to draw on. 
A prosecutor also may be unlikely to include hate crime charges when the 
statutory language itself is considered vague or confusing.  Many prosecutors 
agreed that, with respect to their state’s hate crime legislation, “the way it’s 
worded makes it very hard to prove.”155  A Southern prosecutor elaborated, 
“[T]he general rule is that you charge the highest offense you can prove at trial, 
but some statutes are drafted in such a confusing way that it affects your screening 
  
150. For example, in Michigan, the maximum sentence for conviction under the standalone hate crime 
statute is two years.  Prosecutors may not value the addition of a few years to a defendant’s sentence.  
Interviews 7, 9, 14. 
151. Interviews 9, 18. 
152. Interview 7.  One prosecutor agreed that the hate crime charge was less compelling in such cases 
but stressed that these decisions were not up to individual prosecutors.  “We must charge if the 
evidence is there,” the prosecutor insisted, “otherwise it constitutes malpractice by the state.”  
Interview 14. 
153. See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 86 
(1968); Stephanos Bibas, Pleas’ Progress, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1024, 1039 (2004) (noting how under 
pre-Booker guidelines, “[p]rosecutors can overcharge to gain leverage for harsh sentences, and 
judges have little power to check prosecutorial harshness[, and] [i]f judges try to cut sweet deals 
unilaterally, say by departing from the Guidelines, they face appellate reversal”). 
154. Of course, this silence could suggest a lack of candor among the prosecutors with whom I spoke.  
But it could also be reconciled with a traditional account of plea bargaining: With so many statutes 
from which to choose, even if prosecutors are prone to overcharge, they still may not charge each 
and every applicable statute and enhancement in a given case.  This seems a plausible explanation 
given the voluminous criminal code. 
155. See, e.g., Interviews 8, 16.  Others agreed that “it’s so vaguely worded, there’s no incentive to use it 
the way it’s written.”  Interview 15. 
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decisions.  If a statute isn’t well written, I won’t use it.  And if they’re close, I’ll 
pick one that’s easy and simple.”156 
Even when a statute is clearly worded, proof of motive is exceedingly diffi-
cult, and the possibility of multiple motives often complicates a case such that 
prosecutors may be dissuaded from including hate crime charges.  Many prosecu-
tors, when explaining why they do not use hate crime legislation more often, spoke 
about how difficult the cases are to prove.157  Specifically, prosecutors discussed the 
problematics of discerning motivation as a huge disincentive for using hate crime 
statutes.158  “It’s impossible to know what’s in someone’s heart” was a common re-
frain.159  Moreover, when there is a conflicting motivation, the scenario becomes 
increasingly complicated.160 
Prosecutors generally agreed that hate crime cases are “difficult if there is 
any other motive.”161  Notably, no state statute or court requires but-for causa-
tion in hate crime cases, so a demonstration of substantial motivation would be 
legally sufficient.162  Nonetheless, a California prosecutor explained, “[W]hen 
the defendant was motivated by hatred for a rival gang and hatred for blacks, it 
would have been hard to prove substantial motivation [as is necessary for the 
state statute] because there was a competing motivation.”163  Similarly, a Texas 
prosecutor explained that in a case in which African Americans killed an Indian 
  
156. Interview 1.  Another prosecutor noted, “I don’t want instructions longer than six pages.  Simple 
and short instructions are ideal.”  Interview 25. 
157. Forty-five of fifty-two prosecutors agreed with this statement. 
158. Sometimes the circumstances are less than clear.  For example, in 1992, David Dinkins, then-
Mayor of New York, alleged that a beating by white Jewish men of a black man was a hate crime, 
outraging the Jewish community, whose leaders claimed that the black man was a burglar and the 
Jewish men were fighting him off.  An accusation of bias itself can be extremely contentious and 
can inflame intergroup tensions.  Jane Fritsch, Police Dept. Vows a New Caution in Labeling Crimes 
as Bias Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/22/nyregion/police-
dept-vows-a-new-caution-in-labeling-crimes-as-bias-cases.html. 
159. Interviews 1, 3, 6, 29. 
160. Describing the difficulty in discerning motivation, one Texas prosecutor explained, “It’s a very 
subjective standard . . . . There aren’t that many cases you’re going to have dead-on proof it’s a hate 
crime.”  Dexheimer, supra note 139. 
161. Interviews 8, 16, 22.  A Northwest prosecutor mentioned a recent decision in which a court held 
that cases involving mixed motives could still be charged as hate crimes.  He stressed, however, that 
proof was still enormously difficult and that “normally we look for random selection.”  Interview 5. 
162. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05(a) (McKinney 2008) (defining by statute a hate crime 
perpetrator as one who “intentionally selects the [victim] . . . in whole or in substantial part” on the 
basis of some perceived trait or characteristic of the victim (emphasis added)); In re M.S., 896 P.2d 
1365 (Cal. 1995) (adopting the substantial factor standard through judicial decisions). 
163. Interview 24. 
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store clerk, despite evidence of racial bias, “we didn’t count it as a hate crime be-
cause it was in the course of a robbery.”164 
Difficulty in discerning motivation is especially pronounced when defendant 
and victim knew each other.  Virtually all prosecutors agreed, “[I]f there is a rela-
tionship between defendant and victim, there’s no bias—it’s more personal.”165 
3. Concerns About Jury Reaction 
A prosecutor might choose not to include hate crime charges despite evi-
dence of bias motivation because of concerns about appealing to a jury.  While 
criminal cases rarely go to trial,166 many prosecutors expressed concern about in-
cluding hate crime charges because it might complicate the issues of the case be-
fore a jury.167  Some emphasized that “where there is strong evidence of a serious 
assault, the hate crime component is less compelling.  We won’t charge a hate 
crime because we don’t want to distract the jury.”168 
Such concerns may be based on the perception of hate crime legislation as 
divisive, especially as pertains to historically fraught social and political issues.  
Many stressed the political landscape of their jurisdiction as a reason not to in-
  
164. Interview 16.  A Northeast prosecutor agreed, noting that hate crime statutes are rarely used 
because “proof is so specific and the result is ambiguous, especially since you can get a bump up in 
other ways, which makes it superfluous.”  Interview 29. 
165. Interviews 6, 26.  While some prosecutors maintained that, theoretically, a hate crime charge could 
be brought even when the victim and the defendant have a preexisting relationship, all agreed that, 
in practice, such a relationship would preclude them from adding a hate crime charge. 
166. Fewer than 10 percent of criminal cases are resolved by a jury.  See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE 
COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7 (2011); Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the 
Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 
1138 (2011) (“95 percent of criminal convictions result from guilty pleas and only 5 percent 
result from trials.”); Michelle Alexander, Op-Ed., Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-
crash-the-justice-system.html. 
167. Forty-seven of fifty-two prosecutors expressed concern that including hate crime charges might 
complicate a jury trial.  When asked whether this was really a concern given how few cases go to 
trial, prosecutors responded that, since a jury trial was at least a remote possibility for all cases, they 
approached each charging decision with the understanding that any individual case might go to 
trial.  Interviews 3, 8, 15.  Additionally, prosecutors expressed concern that even judges may not be 
taking hate crimes seriously.  Many spoke about the range of perspectives among judges, stressing 
that younger judges, and especially judges who themselves are from minority groups, seemed more 
inclined to take hate crimes seriously.  Interviews 27, 30.  One particularly uncertain area seemed to 
be when the crime involved a case of mistaken identity—for example, when a heterosexual victim 
was perceived to be gay.  A Massachusetts prosecutor lamented that, despite the statutory language 
that clarifies that a bias charge is appropriate when a victim is selected because of a perception that 
the victim belongs to a particular identity group (even if that perception is incorrect), judges are 
liable to ask, “[T]his person’s not gay, so why are you charging a hate crime?”  Interview 30. 
168. Interviews 7, 9. 
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clude hate crime charges.169  For example, in the murder of a gay man in which 
there is evidence of bias based on sexual orientation, a prosecutor’s decision to add 
a hate crime charge may be directly correlated to the local climate regarding gay 
rights.  Even in cities known to have strong lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) contingents, prosecutors expressed trepidation about in-
cluding hate crime charges based on sexual orientation or gender identity.  A 
New York prosecutor stressed, “you ask different questions in jury selection if 
there is a hate crime charge, especially if it involves victims with different life-
styles, such as transgendered individuals.”170  Others expressed concerns about 
“muddying the waters” and creating “an uphill battle.”171 
Prosecutors representing more conservative jurisdictions were even more 
concerned about possible negative repercussions that might result from the addi-
tion of hate crime charges.  Some mentioned a preference not to dwell on the bias 
element of the crime but instead to highlight other aggravating factors or just to 
focus on proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant assaulted or 
murdered the victim, a verdict that will invariably result in a stiff sentence.172  
Specifically, they were concerned about distracting the jury from the specific de-
tails of an already heinous crime.173  A Southern prosecutor explained, “Selecting 
a jury can be a tricky process at best, but when one has to discuss issues of race, 
gender, and sexual orientation, one enters a potentially charged area.  I might fear 
that a person who is perfectly willing to convict a murderer and would be a great 
juror might be less inclined to do so if asked to render a verdict under a hate crime 
statute based on sexual orientation.”174  In the words of another prosecutor, 
“[W]hy potentially disqualify some of your best jurors if your goal is to punish the 
wrongdoing?”175 
When prosecutors refuse to charge hate crimes because they worry that ju-
ries might be less willing to convict if they believe the reason for a violent crime 
was that the victim was gay, it seems hate crime legislation has not had its intend-
ed effect on that community.  Arguably, the message of hate crime statutes goes 
  
169. Interviews 1, 3, 4, 25. 
170. Interview 28. 
171. Interviews 1, 8. 
172. Interviews 16, 19, 25, 32. 
173. One prosecutor suggested, “[I]f we’re already asking for a life sentence, better not to muddy the 
waters and just go with homicide charges.”  Interview 19. 
174. Interview 25. 
175. Interview 4.  Many prosecutors acknowledged that there may be strong political reasons not to 
include hate crime charges; specifically, such charges are “divisive” and “make people 
uncomfortable.”  Interviews 1, 8, 29.  One queried, “Why do we need to speak about these 
issues?  It just makes it messy.  It’s better to keep the community from feeling bad about itself.”  
Interview 3. 
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unheard in these jurisdictions.176  A paradox thus emerges: In those communities 
least tolerant of diversity (and, as a corollary, those that might benefit most from 
receiving the expressive messages of equality and tolerance), prosecutors may be 
least inclined to include hate crime charges for fear of losing the jury to a political-
ly volatile issue. 
Notably, a few prosecutors from large cities in heavily liberal districts sug-
gested that they might be disinclined to use hate crime legislation for a very differ-
ent reason—fear that good jurors could be disqualified for cause if they admitted 
their prejudice against a defendant who faced hate crime charges.  These prosecu-
tors stressed that hate crime charges are “taken very seriously [by the jury]” and 
that “your best jurors get hostile right away.  They want to punish the defendant 
more harshly.”177  One Northwest prosecutor cited a new phenomenon that some 
prosecutors have faced in voir dire: “We now have jurors saying that they can’t be 
fair to a defendant accused of hate crimes.”178  Thus, for seemingly dichotomous 
reasons, both involving the fear of alienating a jury, prosecutors may be disinclined 
to include hate crime charges in archetypal hate crime cases. 
C. A Counterexample: Recent Uses of Hate Crime Legislation  
in Nonarchetypal Cases 
Proponents of hate crime legislation have criticized the underuse and incon-
sistent use of the laws in archetypal cases.179  Another critique, which is increas-
ingly salient, addresses the perceived misuse of hate crime charges in 
nonarchetypal cases.  Indeed, an entrepreneurial district attorney’s office might 
widely and systematically include hate crime charges against criminal defendants 
to increase leverage at the plea-bargaining stage in non-hate-motivated crimes.180 
This is exactly what has happened recently in Queens, New York.  New 
York does not require a showing of animus for conviction on a hate crime charge, 
  
176. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 607, 607–08 (2000) (noting that, in contexts such as date rape and drunk driving, 
while legislators may enact laws with an intent to change social norms, prosecutors may resist 
enforcing the laws if the norms are widespread, thus reinforcing the norms that legislators hoped to 
change). 
177. Interview 24. 
178. Interview 5. 
179. See supra Part II.B. 
180. Arguably, prosecutors could gain leverage by adding hate crime charges more widely in archetypal 
cases as well.  But many prosecutors suggested that for more serious violent crimes, there are many 
enhancements available such that invoking the hate crime statute seems unnecessary.  See, e.g., 
Interviews 10, 12, 21.  Here, by contrast, a hate crime charge would radically change the possible 
sentencing range and therefore may have special appeal. 
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and the state’s hate crime statute includes age (defined as sixty years or older) as a 
protected category.181  As a result, Kristen Kane, head of the Elder Fraud Unit of 
the Queens District Attorney’s Office, has made a practice of including hate 
crime charges in swindling cases involving elderly victims.182 
The prosecutorial incentives here are clear.  Whereas a conviction for theft 
of less than $1 million carries no mandatory prison time, a conviction for Grand 
Larceny as a Hate Crime carries a minimum of one year in prison and could re-
sult in a sentence of up to twenty-five years.183  While Grand Larceny is a C Fel-
ony, hate crime charges elevate the charge to a B Felony, which is the next 
highest level.  There are other statutory provisions (known as vulnerable victim 
statutes) that cover some elderly victims of fraud, but they are narrower and 
more difficult to prove than New York’s hate crime legislation.184  Thus, whereas 
New York’s hate crime legislation is used in cases in which there is no finding of 
animus or anything more than a perception by the defendant that an elderly in-
dividual is an easy target, the vulnerable victim statute passed specifically to pro-
tect elderly victims of fraud is not used for its intended purpose because of the 
elevated requirements of proof. 
Prosecutors are incentivized to use hate crime legislation in these non-bias-
motivated cases because the laws provide increased leverage in plea bargaining.185  
In 2005, Shirley Miller, a forty-three-year-old woman who swindled four elderly 
men out of $500,000, was the first New York defendant to be charged with 
Grand Larceny as a Hate Crime against the elderly.186  She pled guilty, paid resti-
  
181. According to New York’s hate crime statute, “A person commits a hate crime when he or she . . . 
intentionally selects the person against whom the offense is committed . . . because of a belief or 
perception regarding the race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, 
age, disability or sexual orientation of a person.”  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05 (McKinney 2008).  
For a critical discussion of New York’s hate crime statute, see Brian S. MacNamara, New York’s 
Hate Crimes Act of 2000: Problematic and Redundant Legislation Aimed at Subjective Motivation, 66 
ALB. L. REV. 519 (2003); Ginsberg, supra note 9. 
182. Anne Barnard, A Novel Twist for Prosecution of Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/nyregion/23hate.html. 
183. Id. 
184. New York’s vulnerable victim statute provides an enhancement for schemes to defraud vulnerable 
elders.  The main limitation of this statutory provision, however, is that it requires proof of the 
victim’s impairment.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.65(1)(c) (McKinney 2010); Interview 23.  This is 
in contrast to the state’s hate crime legislation, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05, which requires only 
that the victim be over age sixty. 
185. Prosecutors lacking “better options” in these cases may turn to the hate crime statute as a way to 
increase their leverage in plea bargaining.  Cf. supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
186. See Press Release, Queens Dist. Att’y, Bayside Woman Halts Trial to Plead Guilty to Defrauding 
Four Elderly Men in “Sweetheart” Scam (Oct. 14, 2005), available at http://queensda.org/ 
Press%20Releases/2005%20Press%20Releases/10-October/10-14-2005.htm. 
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tution, and served four months.187  If not for paying the restitution, she would 
have faced up to three years in prison.188  Another defendant pled guilty to similar 
charges and, along with serving four months, received ten years probation.189 
The Queens County prosecutors make no attempt to define these cases as 
archetypal hate crimes, or even as distinct from ordinary crimes of opportunity.  
Kane explained, “Criminals that prey on the elderly, they love the elderly—this is 
their source of wealth,” adding, “[w]e don’t have a whole lot of tools . . . . We 
should utilize what the legislature has given us.”190  Indeed, the Elder Fraud 
Unit’s website describes itself as “creative in using every tool available to prosecute 
those who victimize the elderly” and credits the Unit with “the first conviction in 
New York State under the Hate Crimes statute under the protected attribute of 
age.”191  Queens is considered “a leader in finding new uses for hate crime laws,” 
according to prosecutors in other jurisdictions.192 
This phenomenon shows signs of becoming more widespread in the near 
future.193  While Kathleen Hogan, president of the State District Attorneys As-
sociation, had not heard of other offices using hate crime legislation in this way, 
she “looked into the efforts after hearing about it from a reporter, called it ‘an 
epiphany’ and said she would suggest it to the group’s committee on best prac-
tices.”194 
It is not surprising that the use of hate crime legislation in routine swindling 
cases involving the elderly has been lauded as a positive step toward punishing 
those who target vulnerable victims.195  A close look at the text of New York’s bias 
crime law, however, suggests a disconnect between legislative intent and the stat-
ute’s use by Queens’ prosecutors in the Elder Fraud Unit.  The legislation’s statu-
  
187. Barnard, supra note 182. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. RICHARD A. BROWN, QUEENS DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE ELDER FRAUD UNIT, OPENING 
ARGUMENT: PROTECTING THE ELDERLY FROM FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION (2007). 
192. Barnard, supra note 182. 
193. King’s County (Brooklyn) has charged Grand Larceny as a Hate Crime, and other jurisdictions in 
New York State have considered bringing similar charges.  See Meredith Hoffman, Accused 
Mortgage Scammer Charged With Hate Crime for Stealing $350K, DNAINFO N.Y. (Mar. 7, 2012, 
4:39 PM), http://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20120307/prospect-heights-bed-stuy-crown-
heights/accused-mortgage-scammer-charged-with-hate-crime-for-stealing-350k.  Other 
jurisdictions may follow suit as they learn that this approach has proven successful in Queens.  
Interview 23. 
194. Barnard, supra note 182. 
195. Indeed, there may be a strong moral intuition that targeting vulnerable victims is morally worse 
than targeting others without that vulnerability.  See generally Joshua Kleinfeld, A Theory of Criminal 
Victimization, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1087 (2013). 
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tory preamble focuses on animus, asserting that “[c]rimes motivated by invidious 
hatred toward particular groups not only harm individual victims but send a pow-
erful message of intolerance and discrimination to all members of the group to 
which the victim belongs.”196  While the reason for prosecutors’ use of hate crime 
legislation in swindling cases is perfectly understandable given their goals of effi-
ciency and extracting a favorable plea deal, the crimes involved indisputably are 
not “motivated by invidious hatred.”  Rather, the elderly victims are chosen be-
cause of a perception that they are more gullible or prone to influence.197 
This novel use of New York’s hate crime statute provides a compelling il-
lustration of how the expressive messages of legislation may change between en-
actment and enforcement because of differing institutional incentives.  
Paradoxically, it seems prosecutors may be most incentivized to use hate crime 
legislation when the original meaning of the legislation is most diluted.  But is 
this new development problematic, or is it rather a positive extension of laws in-
tended to protect people targeted on the basis of their identity?  When hate 
crime laws are invoked in cases entirely devoid of animus, and when the crime 
appears more like a crime of opportunity than one that targets a victim based on 
group membership, the connection between that crime and the motivation for 
hate crime legislation becomes increasingly diffuse.  When a hate crime begins 
to resemble an ordinary crime of opportunity, one wonders what expressive mes-
sage is really sent and whether there is any limit to the expanding universe of 
hate crimes.198 
Prosecutors familiar with the Elder Fraud Unit discussed limiting principles 
that inform what cases the office might charge as hate crimes.199  First, they 
acknowledged that not all people sixty and over are in the same category.200  
While the Queens Elder Fraud Unit views hate crime legislation as a better op-
tion than New York’s vulnerable victim statute because it does not require proof 
of infirmity, the office has considered adding hate crime charges only when the 
  
196. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.00 (McKinney 2008). 
197. Arguably, crimes against elderly victims based on such perceptions may reinforce social stereotypes 
of the elderly, thus resulting in increased harm not only to the individual victim but also to the 
identity group more widely.  Presumably, however, the very existence of a vulnerable victim statute 
to cover crimes against children and the elderly could also be said to reinforce such stereotypes. 
198. Thus far, the Elder Fraud Unit has focused on fraud such as the typical sweetheart scam, which 
involves a younger person (usually a woman), who tells false tales of woe (a terrible disease or 
financial crisis), imploring the victim to help.  Interview 23.  There are commonalities among the 
victims; sweetheart scam defendants generally target elderly victims who live alone, have no family, 
and can be described as more vulnerable.  Id.  All convictions thus far for Grand Larceny as a Hate 
Crime have been on pleas.  Id. 
199. Interviews 23, 51. 
200. Id. 
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victim was infirm in some way (and the youngest victim in a Grand Larceny as a 
Hate Crime case to date was seventy-eight years old).201  Nonetheless, the Elder 
Fraud Unit’s use of New York’s hate crime statute is entirely detached from the 
professed legislative aim of combating “invidious hatred.” 
Prosecutors acknowledged that not all criminal justice actors believe that the 
Elder Fraud Unit office’s approach in charging Grand Larceny as a Hate Crime 
is justified.  One explained, “The defense bar resents the lack of animus involved.  
Defense attorneys allege that these aren’t actually hate crimes.”202  Judges may al-
so regard such cases with skepticism, “refusing to take these financial crimes seri-
ously.  Some question, ‘is this even a crime?’ wondering how a person’s request for 
a loan can constitute a hate crime against the elderly.”203  But some prosecutors 
maintain that, given the limited tools provided by the legislature, the Elder Fraud 
Unit would be remiss not to use them if the evidence is there and the facts war-
rant the addition of a hate crime charge.204 
D. Expressive Consequences 
Prosecutors send messages through their enforcement decisions, whether 
intentionally or not.205  Thus, when cases that appear to be crimes of opportunity 
are prosecuted as hate crimes, the message of combating intergroup hatred that 
motivated enactment of the legislation may seem diluted.  Interest group leaders 
were skeptical about the use of hate crime legislation in nonarchetypal cases,206 
  
201. Furthermore, the office has not charged a hate crime when the defendant and victim previously 
knew each other.  Interview 23.  Such cases generally involve well-known family members or close 
friends and are understood to be crimes of opportunity.  Id. 
202. Interview 51. 
203. Acknowledging that the outcome is very judge-specific, one prosecutor lamented, “I can’t say that 
courts are taking these cases more seriously; we’re not yet seeing a favorable trend.”  Interview 23. 
204. Id. (maintaining that the use of hate crime legislation in cases involving financial fraud against the 
elderly “does not dilute the importance of hate crime legislation” and that “financial crimes may not 
be violent but they are still devastating”).  Another prosecutor stressed that what elderly victims of 
financial crimes really want is their money back and possibly a stay-away order so they feel 
protected from future exploitation.  Interview 51 (explaining that “being part of the criminal justice 
system is hard for the elderly” and that it is considered a positive outcome when defendant returns 
the victim’s money even if it results in reduced (or no) jail time). 
205. For comparative discussions of expressive enforcement in the international law context, see 
Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal 
Court, 33 MICH J. INT’L L. 265 (2012); Mark A. Drumbl, The Expressive Value of Prosecuting and 
Punishing Terrorists: Hamdan, The Geneva Conventions, and International Criminal Law, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1165 (2007). 
206. See, e.g., Interviews A–C, E–I. 
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invoking legislative history and intent to bolster their claim that hate crime legis-
lation should be limited to archetypal cases.207 
By contrast, supporters of hate crime legislation expect archetypal hate 
crimes to be prosecuted as such; when they are not, these are the cases most likely 
to infuriate those who believe that they are entitled to the full benefit of the legis-
lation.208  Interest group leaders may feel that refusing to prosecute archetypal 
cases as hate crimes makes a mockery of their victimization and of hate crime leg-
islation in general.209 
Some interest group leaders complained that archetypal hate crime cases 
routinely fall through the cracks and that this sends the message that members of 
the victim’s group are not valued by law enforcement and society.210  Especially 
for victim groups who may already be fearful of police,211 when crimes that appear 
to be bias motivated are not enforced as hate crimes, this may reinforce a victim’s 
apprehension about law enforcement, leading to a “victimology that bubbles be-
neath the surface.”212  Some described this phenomenon as a vicious circle of un-
derreporting and underenforcement; when victims do not believe that their 
interests are taken seriously, they are less likely to report, which leads to even less 
enforcement, which in turn leads to less reporting.213 
Even in the absence of an increased penalty for the defendant, the very act of 
law enforcement’s naming a case as bias motivated may help the victim and the 
victim’s community to heal.214  Especially in a case involving a violent felony with 
an already-lengthy sentence, while an extra penalty may not matter much, “send-
  
207. See, e.g., Interviews B, D, E. 
208. See, e.g., Michael Barajas, Anti-gay Crimes Rarely Prosecuted in Texas by Name, SAN ANTONIO 
CURRENT (June 27, 2012), http://sacurrent.com/news/anti-gay-crimes-rarely-prosecuted-in-
texas-by-name-1.1335230 (documenting the outrage of a murder victim’s sister at law 
enforcement’s refusal to charge a hate crime despite alleged evidence of bias based on sexual 
orientation: “Hate-crimes laws were passed to protect people like my brother Troy, and who are 
they protecting if nobody’s familiar with it and nobody’s using it?” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  When an archetypal hate crime occurs and there are no arrests or charges, interested 
parties and victims’ groups often hold marches and rallies to signal their outrage.  Id. 
209. See, e.g., Interviews B–D, F, J. 
210. See, e.g., Interviews D, F, K.  Interest group leaders complained that law enforcement often did not 
sufficiently investigate claims of bias motivation or were unwilling to include hate crime charges 
even in the face of indisputable evidence of bias motivation.  Id. 
211. Leading examples include transgendered persons and immigrants.  See Interviews 33, 40, 
G–H, L, M. 
212. Interviews 13, 21, 36. 
213. Interview 36. 
214. Interview 13. 
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ing a message” validating the victim’s worth and condemning the defendant’s 
hateful conduct may be hugely significant.215 
The impact of messages sent by hate crime enforcement practices should 
not be underestimated.  Moreover, the mismatch between legislative expression 
and prosecutorial incentives, once documented, should be addressed by legisla-
tors and others concerned about the consistency and coherence of hate crime 
messaging.216 
III. NARROWING THE ENACTMENT-ENFORCEMENT GAP 
Legislators insist on the importance of sending a message condemning bias-
motivated crimes, positing that these crimes are especially threatening to social 
cohesion as they are more prone to result in group harm and the possibility of re-
taliation.217  Prosecutors, however, may lack incentives to use hate crime charges 
in archetypal cases, thus jeopardizing the continuity (and even sincerity) of legis-
lative messaging.218 
Faced with a disconnect between promulgation and enforcement of hate 
crime laws, legislators could choose to repeal the legislation, simply ignore the 
tension, or take measures to realign incentives in order to bring enforcement in 
line with the expressive goals of enactment.  This Part assumes that, while legisla-
tors might choose to amend existing hate crime laws or to limit further expansion 
of the laws, political considerations make them unlikely to repeal the laws entire-
ly.  If legislators want to keep hate crime laws on the books but also want to nar-
row the messaging gap between enactment and enforcement of the legislation, 
what concrete steps could be taken?  Having examined the effects of different 
statutory schemes and political and cultural factors on the practical workings of 
hate crime enforcement, this Part addresses ways that institutional actors might 
more effectively align enactment and enforcement of hate crime legislation and 
explores the underlying complications inherent in each approach.  It then sug-
gests ways in which lessons from the hate crime context might be applicable more 
generally. 
  
215. Chuck Smith, Executive Deputy Director of Equality Texas, a lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) lobbying group, explained, “I think that in many cases families would find 
some level of contentment if there was some sort of a public acknowledgement that, yes, this was a 
bias-motivated crime.”  Barajas, supra note 208; see also Interviews 13, 19. 
216. While the mismatch between enactment and enforcement messaging is of obvious concern to 
those who accept an expressivist justification for hate crime legislation, this mismatch is also crucial 
to retributivist and utilitarian accounts of hate crime legislation, as it fundamentally affects a 
defendant’s punishment and incapacitation. 
217. See supra Part I.B. 
218. See supra Part II.B. 
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A. Addressing Concerns of Underuse in Archetypal Cases 
A proponent of hate crime legislation trying to achieve more prosecutions 
of archetypal hate crimes might recommend the following: First, at the flagging 
stage, police and prosecutors could be better equipped to identify possible bias-
motivated crimes and more sensitized to the gravity of harm caused by these 
cases.  Second, creating designated units (or appointing point people) focused 
on hate crime enforcement may cause prosecutors to pay special attention to bi-
as-motivated crimes.219  Third, legislators concerned that prosecutors may be 
disinclined to use hate crime statutes in archetypal cases because they would not 
significantly alter a defendant’s sentence might amend the statutes to ensure 
that a hate crime conviction would meaningfully affect a defendant’s sentence.  
Prosecutors will almost certainly consider whether a hate crime charge, if prov-
en, could make a meaningful difference in the defendant’s sentence when de-
ciding whether to include a hate crime charge.  Finally, legislators wishing to 
encourage prosecutors to include hate crime charges in archetypal cases might 
choose to revise and simplify jury instructions or even to leave the question of 
determining bias motive to the judge rather than the jury, to alleviate prosecu-
tors’ concerns of alienating a jury by adding a hate crime charge. 
Each of these suggestions assumes that legislators want to increase hate 
crime prosecutions in archetypal cases and that defendants who commit bias-
motivated crimes should receive a higher sentence than those who commit paral-
lel, non-hate-motivated crimes.  But this premise raises serious concerns about 
whether, in all archetypal hate crime cases, a higher sentence would be either ad-
visable or even feasible.220  With these concerns in mind, this Subpart will explore 
statutory and organizational reforms that might increase hate crime prosecution 
in archetypal cases.  While the suggested approaches focus on altering prosecuto-
rial incentives in order to increase hate crime prosecution, they may be used in 
tandem with other nonlegal recommendations for bridging the enactment-
enforcement messaging gap. 
1. Training Police and Prosecutors 
Legislators might take steps to align enforcement practices with legislative 
messaging by passing legislation that would fund the creation of special hate 
  
219. See BELL, supra note 121, at 132. 
220. See infra notes 236–238 and accompanying text. 
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crime units and training programs for prosecutors and police.221  As the first mov-
ers in hate crime enforcement, police must have the tools to identify bias motives 
and to flag them for the prosecutors in their jurisdiction.  By funding police train-
ing programs, legislators could better ensure that police have the tools to properly 
identify possible hate crime cases. 
Prosecutors in jurisdictions where police are trained to flag hate crime cases 
noted the success of such efforts.  One Northwest prosecutor emphasized the im-
portance of police training, explaining that in his jurisdiction there is now a train-
ing video for police and that “since the training, there’s been no problem with 
flagging.”222  Other prosecutors confirmed that screening for hate crimes “starts 
in the police station.”223  A Massachusetts prosecutor noted that in Boston, there 
is a police department unit devoted entirely to hate crimes, explaining, “[I]f 
there’s no independent unit and police aren’t trained, there’s no chance.  Educa-
tion is key.  Culture is key.  If racial epithets are common in a culture, they won’t 
serve as a signal to police as something to flag.”224 
In addition, police departments whose reporting forms do not include a 
“possible bias motive” box could consider amending their forms in order to make 
the identification and reporting of possible hate crimes more systematic.  Such 
changes could begin with prosecutors.  If prosecutors make an affirmative deci-
sion that hate crime prosecution is a priority, they can both adjust the office infra-
structure to support this mandate and provide police with the tools to recognize 
possible bias motives and to flag cases for further investigation and possible pros-
ecution.  Legislative support is crucial, however; prosecutors’ commitment will 
likely not take root unless they are given a statutory incentive to use the legislation, 
  
221. Of course, prosecutors could develop their own hate crime protocols.  As a starting point, 
individual offices could keep records of how many hate crimes were reported, investigated, charged, 
pled, and convicted in their jurisdiction.  See Interviews 6, 33. 
222. Interview 5 (“It’s a very practical video and we went over the elements of a bias crime, focusing on 
the importance of construing the possibility of bias motive broadly.  [Because gender-bias crime is 
uncommon,] it wouldn’t be recognized as such if there wasn’t training.  We teach them that if he’s 
calling her names, spitting on her, and calling her the c-word, it’s not just disorderly conduct, it’s a 
felony.”). 
223. Interviews 9, 14. 
224. Interview 30.  While many prosecutors focused on the importance of training police to flag cases, 
others deemphasized the training, explaining “it isn’t rocket science.  It’s an enhancement and 
describing it takes two minutes.  If you have the facts, you can use it.  It’s not an in-depth deal.  It 
isn’t like search and seizure.”  Interview 4.  Prosecutorial attitudes cannot be explained in a vacuum 
and, not surprisingly, the prosecutors that emphasized the importance of police training worked in 
those jurisdictions that featured a bias officer or screener, whereas those prosecutors that 
deemphasized the significance of police training worked in jurisdictions where no such 
specialization exists and bias charges are rarely, if ever, used in practice. 
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are trained to use the legislation, and are working within an infrastructure that 
supports the legislation’s use. 
Even in jurisdictions where police recommend charges, prosecutors gener-
ally are the ultimate arbiters as to what charges should be brought and can accept, 
decline, or alter the officer’s recommendation.225  Thus, legislators concerned that 
archetypal hate crimes are not being prosecuted as such could allocate funding to 
train prosecutors how to investigate and prosecute hate crime cases. 
Of course, prosecutors could also take the lead to train those in their ranks if 
they were so inclined, with professional associations spearheading these efforts.  
Despite the existence of state and national district attorney associations, no pros-
ecutor with whom I spoke was aware of any hate crime–related training program 
administered by a professional association.  A Southern prosecutor who lamented 
the lack of awareness about hate crime legislation in her office noted: 
It really has to be emphasized by professional associations.  Every [as-
sistant district attorney] is a member of the [state] association and 
there are annual conferences.  Professional associations should high-
light bias crime prosecution in trainings, telling prosecutors, “this is 
important to protect people, and here’s how.”  The associations must 
have a strong hand in disseminating materials once they illustrate that 
this is important.  Only this will lead to cooperation.226 
Other prosecutors believed that the national professional association 
should be responsible for training.  One prosecutor observed, “I’ve never seen a 
class offered either by [the state organization] or by the [National District At-
torney Association].  There’s no level of awareness in our state’s offices.  It’s no 
surprise given the lack of training.”227 
2. Designating Hate Crime Units  
Given time pressures, scarce resources, and the wide array of legislation at a 
prosecutor’s disposal, one might suspect that, beyond stock offenses (the bread 
and butter of prosecutors’ charges), a prosecutor is unlikely to use particular stat-
utes unless someone brings them to the prosecutor’s attention.  The creation and 
funding of hate crime units to oversee hate crime prosecution would help to foster 
enforcement expertise. 
  
225. The literature on prosecutorial declination is vast.  See generally Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and 
Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911 (2006); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial 
Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243 (2011). 
226. Interview 3. 
227. Interview 1. 
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Prosecutors noted that without a designated unit to oversee the office’s ef-
forts to prosecute hate crimes, those cases were unlikely to surface in a consistent 
or reliable manner.228  A New York City prosecutor stressed, “If there’s no spe-
cialized unit, hate crime charges won’t be discussed.”229  Of course, it is unlikely 
that many district attorneys’ offices other than the largest offices in the most de-
mographically diverse jurisdictions will support the creation of a hate crimes bu-
reau.230  Still, offices that are not large enough to warrant a devoted hate crimes 
bureau might designate a hate crimes officer.  This prosecutor would soon be-
come an expert on the jurisdiction’s applicable hate crime statute and would de-
velop a specialized familiarity about when charges are and are not appropriate. 
For example, in New Jersey, every county prosecutor’s office has at least 
one bias officer, and Essex County (the largest in the state) has two specialized 
bias officers.231  All bias officers in the state meet monthly to discuss trends in 
hate crimes and hate crime prosecution.232  After describing the infrastructure 
for hate crime prosecution and awareness in New Jersey, a prosecutor empha-
sized that “as a result of our efforts, we don’t have these problems as much.”233  
Even in counties with offices that are too small to have someone focused exclu-
sively on hate crime prosecution, one prosecutor could still be given the respon-
sibility of screening bias cases so that the police have a point person who they 
know will oversee any possible hate crime cases. 
3. Addressing Problems of Statutory Interaction 
In their charging decisions, prosecutors often choose between different stat-
utes, leaving some seemingly fitting statutes to fall by the wayside because anoth-
er law proves a superior fit.  While this is a common phenomenon in criminal 
law, arguably the more prominent the expressive aspect of a law, the more signifi-
cant it is when that law is not used when it seems to fit the facts of a given case.  
This concern is especially salient in the hate crime context given the predomi-
nantly expressive justification for hate crime legislation.  This expressive focus in-
creases the possibility that a lack of hate crime enforcement in archetypal cases 
  
228. Interviews 24, 27, 30. 
229. Interview 28. 
230. Some prosecutors, especially those from Southern and Midwestern cities, were surprised to learn 
during our conversations that other cities, such as Los Angeles and New York City, have 
specialized hate crime bureaus or units.  See, e.g., Interviews 1, 3, 8. 
231. Interview 6. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
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may send unintended messages to victims and others that the government does 
not actually intend to protect all its citizens against bias-motivated crimes. 
As demonstrated in Part II, prosecutors may be disinclined to use hate 
crime legislation when preexisting statutes already have significant penalties for 
particular crimes.234  Moreover, when hate crime enhancements do not increase 
the maximum penalty, as in the case of first-degree felonies and class A misde-
meanors in Texas,235 adding a hate crime charge may only increase the prosecu-
tor’s burden without providing any tangible benefit. 
In cases in which prosecutors might be disinclined to use hate crime statutes 
because of structural reasons pertaining to the state criminal code, legislators con-
cerned about the expressive function of nonenforcement might consider revising 
the statutes in order to mitigate these structural concerns.  In addition, when con-
sidering future criminal legislation, consideration should be given to how these 
laws would interact with existing hate crime legislation and in what ways they 
might affect prosecutorial incentives. 
Legislators could affect prosecutorial incentives by ensuring that a hate 
crime enhancement actually triggers a meaningful sentence increase.  For exam-
ple, a hate crime law might specify that, if proven, the hate crime charge would 
add a certain number of months to the defendant’s sentence or that it would in-
crease the defendant’s sentence by a certain percentage.  This would be possible 
for all cases except those few that involve life sentences.236  While in some cases a 
prosecutor might still decide that it is not worth it to add a hate crime charge, that 
prosecutor would not be able to claim that a hate crime charge would not increase 
a defendant’s sentencing range.  Legislators could also incentivize prosecutors to 
use hate crime statutes in states with standalone hate crime statutes, either by 
setting higher minimum sentences for standalone bias crimes than for their 
parallel non-bias-motivated crimes or by creating a broader sentencing range 
for standalone bias crimes, providing the sentencing judge with discretion to 
sentence appropriately given the magnitude of the crime. 
But there may be several reasons why increasing a defendant’s sentence in all 
archetypal hate crime cases is undesirable or impractical.  First, in archetypal hate 
crime cases that are particularly violent and traumatic to the victim’s identity group 
(such as Matthew Shepard’s brutal murder) there is simply no possibility for a 
meaningful sentence increase since, depending on the state, a defendant will likely 
  
234. See supra Part II.B. 
235. See supra Part II.B.2. 
236. Of course, even a shorter sentence could be deemed high enough by prosecutors such that they 
would be disinclined to include a hate crime charge.  A system of harsh sentencing may therefore 
significantly undermine the expressive value of hate crime enforcement. 
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already be sentenced either to life without parole or to death.  Second, a growing 
concern that criminal sentences in the United States are already overly severe gives 
rise to the question whether it would even be advisable to significantly increase 
sentences through a hate crime or other enhancement.237  Many have lamented 
the unusually high sentences in the United States and have questioned whether 
this is a wise use of criminal justice resources.238  If there is already a concern that 
sentences are generally too high, this would suggest that increasing sentences fur-
ther might lead to even more excessive sentences.  Finally, further research would 
be necessary to determine how much sentences would need to be increased to in-
centivize prosecutors to expend the extra resources and take the added (at least 
perceived) risk of adding a hate crime charge.  Even when increased sentences are 
plausible, if a prosecutor considers that she can reliably depend on a high sentence 
from a judge she may be unlikely (without other expressive motivation) to add the 
hate crime charge since she already considers the sentence sufficient.239  This cal-
culation would likely be case specific, depending on the historical, political, and 
social circumstances of the jurisdiction and the identity group dynamics, as well as 
the prosecutor’s priorities and the office norms. 
4. Preferring Judge to Jury 
While an increasingly small number of cases go to jury trials,240 prosecutors 
who take seriously the ethical dictates that they charge only those counts that they 
credibly could try before a jury will carefully consider the issue of appealing to a 
jury.  Prosecutors therefore may be less likely to add hate crime charges if the jury 
instructions are confusing or overly lengthy.  If made available, model jury in-
structions that are short, simple, and user friendly might incentivize prosecutors 
to use hate crime statutes in archetypal cases. 
Alternatively, if jury instructions prove so complicated that, even when sim-
plified, prosecutors would be dissuaded from including hate crime charges, the 
task of determining a bias motive could potentially be given to judges instead of 
juries.  While a judge may not enhance a defendant’s criminal sentence beyond 
  
237. Even if one agrees that, in theory, hate crime defendants deserve a more severe sentence than 
defendants convicted of parallel crimes because the bias-motivated crime is more heinous, one 
might still believe that sentences in general are too high and therefore that an enhancement for 
proof of bias motivation is unjustifiable.  These competing notions of proportionality may explain 
why, for some, an intuition that hate crime enhancements make sense in theory may not translate 
into support for hate crime enhancements in practice. 
238. See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 166, at 5–7. 
239. See supra notes 144–154 and accompanying text. 
240. See STUNTZ, supra note 166. 
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the statutory maximum unless based on facts found by a jury to be beyond a rea-
sonable doubt,241 the judge could consider a bias motive as a factor when deter-
mining a defendant’s sentence within the sentencing range.242 
There are a number of possible reasons for preferring judge to jury.  First, as 
institutional actors who are familiar with the complexities of legal doctrine, judg-
es may be better equipped to analyze a hate crime statute.  Second, while judges 
are not impervious to local politics, they may be more objective about fraught cul-
tural and social issues.  Moreover, it may not matter whether juries are actually 
capable of maintaining objectivity in practice; so long as prosecutors continue to 
believe that hate crime charges will have adverse effects on the jury pool, this be-
lief alone may be enough to make it unlikely that prosecutors will include the 
charges in archetypal cases. 
B. Addressing Concerns of Misuse in Nonarchetypal Cases 
In order to sharpen our focus on those cases that appropriately can be 
deemed archetypal hate crimes, this Subpart concentrates on ways to limit the 
misuse of hate crime prosecution in nonarchetypal cases.  To address concerns 
that charging nonarchetypal cases as hate crimes may dilute the potency of hate 
crime legislation,243 legislators might choose to amend hate crime statutes by 
adding an animus requirement, thus eliminating the possibility that ordinary 
crimes of opportunity would be charged as hate crimes.  They might also consider 
limiting the expansion of protected categories to those categories for which 
group-based animus is of particular concern. 
1. Requiring Animus 
Legislators might choose to add an animus requirement in order to avoid 
concerns about dilution and to ensure that only archetypal hate crimes were 
charged as such.  By including a requirement that the victim was selected based 
on intergroup bias, prejudice, or hostility, legislators could ensure that hate 
  
241. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 491–97 (2000). 
242. In jurisdictions where there is a significant range in sentencing for a particular crime, the result 
could be quite substantial.  In New York, for example, the sentencing range for a class B Violent 
Felony is between five and twenty-five years.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.02(3)(a) (McKinney 2009).  
For those judges that already tend to sentence at or near the top of the range, making a bias motive 
another factor that warrants enhancement may not yield any notable change in sentencing.  But it is 
possible that a judge’s taking notice of the bias element and labeling the crime accordingly could 
still serve expressive goals even if the increase in defendant’s sentence was negligible. 
243. See supra Part II.D. 
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crime laws would be used only in cases of invidious hatred rather than in cases 
in which the crime, however heinous, was actually a crime of opportunity and 
not an archetypal hate crime.  Arguably this revision, while ensuring that ordi-
nary crimes of opportunity are not prosecuted as hate crimes, would also make 
even archetypal hate crimes more difficult to prove since the requirement of an-
imus is a more stringent standard than that of intentional selection.  This possi-
ble amendment is therefore in tension with suggestions geared to encourage 
prosecutors to charge hate crimes,244 suggesting a trade-off to be made by indi-
vidual legislators. 
2. Limiting New Protected Categories 
The expressive effect of adding new protected categories ought to be con-
sidered by legislators both in isolation and with respect to how their inclusion 
may affect the understanding of preexisting categories.  The addition of too 
many categories (especially of categories that are not understood by many to be 
aspects of a person’s core identity) may dilute the communicative impact of hate 
crime legislation.  Take, for example, the categories of matriculation and per-
sonal appearance in D.C.’s hate crime statute.245  Prosecutors described these 
recently added categories, along with homelessness and family status, as “not 
helpful designations.”246  While it may seem costless for legislators to add such 
categories, if never used and even derided by D.C. prosecutors, they threaten to 
make a mockery of the broader endeavor of hate crime legislation.247 
Race, the paradigmatic protected category for hate crime legislation, could 
help to guide an exploration of potential additional categories.248  Oriented by a 
concern with combating harms caused by intergroup prejudice and symbolic 
victimization, legislators could look to other aspects of core identity that, his-
  
244. See supra Part III.A.3. 
245. Matriculation is not defined in the D.C. statute, but prosecutors understand it to refer to targeting 
based on “two warring schools or educational groups.”  Interview 31.  Official materials do not 
include any mention of matriculation or personal appearance.  See BIAS-RELATED CRIME IN THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (2010) (compiled by the Offices of the Mayor and Chief of Police). 
246. Interview 31. 
247. There is, however, a growing literature on the pervasiveness of discrimination based on personal 
appearance.  See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF 
APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND WORK (2010).  And various jurisdictions have addressed this issue in 
their civil codes.  See, e.g., Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2202 
(West 2001 & Supp. 2013) (banning discrimination in employment based on height and weight, 
among other factors). 
248. See supra Part I.C. 
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torically, have been divisive.  Such categories as religion and sexual orientation 
surely would qualify. 
By contrast, when increased protection for a group already exists in the 
form of vulnerable victim or other such statutes that provide for sentencing en-
hancements, inclusion of that identity group as a protected category in hate 
crime laws may be unnecessary.  For example, many states include a vulnerable 
victim statute that protects children and the elderly, arguably making the inclu-
sion of age as a protected category for hate crime legislation unduly repetitive.249  
Of course, just as legislators might want to incentivize prosecutors to charge ar-
chetypal hate crimes, if they are particularly concerned about protecting the el-
derly through the use of vulnerable victim statutes, they might choose to amend 
vulnerable victim statutes accordingly—for example, in the case of New York, 
by removing the requirement of infirmity. 
C. Managing Enforcement Messaging 
This Subpart identifies ways in which prosecutors and other institutional 
actors, irrespective of the intricacies of individual hate crime laws, might more 
closely align messaging at the enforcement stage with that of legislative en-
actment.  In some instances, a focus directly on enforcement messaging may 
circumvent some of the dilemmas created by trying to bridge the enactment-
enforcement divide through statutory reform or other systemic changes. 
First, prosecutors inclined to see it as their role to send expressive messag-
es might choose to charge a case as a hate crime for symbolic reasons, even if the 
inclusion of a hate crime charge could not affect the result at sentencing.  Se-
cond, prosecutors disinclined to take such risks at the charging stage might still 
take steps to make their charging processes more transparent, thus diffusing in-
terest group tensions.250  Finally, this Subpart explores the possibility of ex-
panding the role of the state attorney general to propagate messages of 
tolerance and to combat hate violence. 
  
249. See supra Part II.C.  This is not to suggest that it would be impossible to have a case involving 
intergroup animus against the elderly but rather to point out that the relationship between hate 
crime and vulnerable victim statutes should be carefully considered. 
250. A normative discussion of the responsibilities of prosecutors is beyond the scope of this Article.  
But the literature on prosecutorial transparency sheds light on the ways in which individual 
prosecutors might address the structural incentives (or disincentives) endemic to hate crime 
legislation.  For a general discussion, see Bibas, supra note 225, and Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. 
Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125 (2008). 
Expressive Enforcement 911 
 
 
1. Symbolic Charging 
Prosecutors differ with respect to whether they believe that it is their re-
sponsibility to send expressive messages.  Some consider it part of their role to 
send a message to victim groups that they are valued by society and to send a 
strong message to perpetrators that racist, homophobic, or other bias-motivated 
behavior will be severely punished.251  Others vehemently disagree, claiming that 
their sole goal is individualized justice, which they achieve on a case-by-case basis 
irrespective of political or interest group pressures.252 
Prosecutors concerned about the messaging function of enforcement might 
be inclined to include hate crime charges even when they would have no practical 
effect.  Cynically, this approach could be said to echo what some argue to be a 
purely symbolic gesture of hate crime law enactment.  Some interest group lead-
ers have advocated for symbolic charging, however, based on the belief that law 
enforcement should be proactive in sending a strong message against hate-
motivated violence.253 
For example, in the explosive aftermath of David Ritcheson’s violent assault 
by alleged white supremacists,254 the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) urged 
prosecutors to add hate crime charges despite the uncontested fact that proof of 
bias motive could not have affected the defendants’ sentence because the case was 
already classified and charged as a first-degree felony.  Martin Cominsky, the 
ADL’s Southwest Regional Director, explained, “We want the public to accept 
and understand that this was a hate crime.”255  Harris County District Attorney 
Trent remained unconvinced, later noting, “While some groups still pressed us to 
pursue hate crime allegations for statistical purposes, I was not about to add any-
thing extra to my burden of proof.”256 
  
251. Fifteen of fifty-two prosecutors mentioned that their role included an expressive component.  Not 
surprisingly, these fifteen included all the prosecutors with whom I spoke who worked in 
specialized bias units or served as the point person to oversee their office’s hate crime enforcement 
efforts.  While those prosecutors who embraced an expressive mission all suggested that for an 
archetypal hate crime they would expect to include hate crime charges, these same prosecutors 
acknowledged statutory incentives that cut against adding a hate crime charge and concerns about 
jury reaction.  Thus, while the individual prosecutors might be more inclined to add hate crime 
charges as part of an expressive mission, the practical realities of hate crime enforcement would 
likely carry sway. 
252. Thirty-three of fifty-two prosecutors agreed that individualized justice was their sole concern. 
253. See supra Part II.D. 
254. See supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text. 
255. No Hate Crime Charges Yet for Teens Accused of Beating Texas Boy, FOX NEWS (Apr. 28, 2006), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2006/04/28/no-hate-crime-charges-yet-for-teens-accused-
beating-texas-boy (internal quotation marks omitted). 
256. Dexheimer, supra note 139 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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While the suggestion of symbolic charging proved unpersuasive in the 
Ritcheson case, prosecutors have used it on occasion—for example, in the 2008 
Texas case involving defendant Terry Mark Mangum who admitted to killing 
Kenneth Cummings because he was gay.257  Brazoria County prosecutor Jeri 
Yenne added hate crime charges despite knowing that a bias finding would make 
no difference in the defendant’s prison term, believing that “the finding was im-
portant.  If you engage in this sort of behavior, there should be some public find-
ing of it.”258  Whatever the theoretical expressive benefits of symbolic charging, it 
seems unlikely that prosecutors will regularly spend scarce prosecutorial resources 
without any hope of a sentencing payoff. 
2. Prosecutorial Transparency 
Increased transparency and improved communication by law enforcement 
might prevent hate crime victims and victim group members from feeling ne-
glected or even betrayed by the government when crimes they perceive as hate 
crimes are not enforced as such.  Prosecutors, in devising a system of best practic-
es, should strive to combine ex ante and ex post transparency.  Ex ante, prosecu-
tors could form partnerships with community organizations to improve public 
trust in the criminal justice system.  They might also partner with other offices in 
the state to unify their approach toward hate crime prosecution.259  Furthermore, 
including hate crime prosecution on a district attorney website would suggest to 
the community that these crimes are taken seriously.260 
These approaches would be well complemented by transparency efforts ex 
post.  When interest groups perceive a case to be a hate crime but it is not prose-
cuted as such, a prosecutor can explain why invoking hate crime legislation in this 
case would not be efficacious.261  While it would violate prosecutorial ethics to try 
  
257. Id.; July 21, TRENDS IN HATE, http://www.trendsinhate.com/hatedates/JulyHateDates/ 
July21.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
258. Dexheimer, supra note 139. 
259. For example, the Michigan Alliance Against Hate Crimes (MIAAHC) is a statewide effort that 
brings prosecutors and community groups together and works to prevent and monitor bias-based 
crimes.  See infra notes 268–269 and accompanying text. 
260. For a discussion of prosecutorial accountability and district attorney websites, see Marc L. Miller & 
Ronald F. Wright, Reporting for Duty: The Universal Prosecutorial Accountability Puzzle and an 
Experimental Transparency Alternative, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
392 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012).  For a more general discussion of district 
attorney’s office management issues as they relate to technological advances, see Ronald Wright & 
Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 65–66 (2002). 
261. While interest group members might be frustrated with a prosecutor who provides an excuse 
grounded in a shortage of resources or time, if the rationale is grounded in statutory concerns and 
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a defendant in the media for offenses not charged,262 a prosecutor could, without 
making any proclamations about a defendant’s culpability or motivation, explain 
the statutory reasons why a hate crime charge would not increase the possible 
sentencing range or might be otherwise ill suited in a particular case. 
In cases for which a state’s hate crime statute simply does not fit the facts, a 
prosecutor’s clear and direct explanation to the victim and interest group leaders 
at the outset could help to diffuse tension.  And in cases for which the evidence of 
bias does not appear to be sufficient but an investigation is ongoing, taking the 
time to explain to the victim that his or her concerns are being taken seriously and 
that the case is being investigated thoroughly may prevent the victim from feeling 
ignored. 
Those prosecutors who already assume such tactics highlighted the im-
portance of transparency in gaining and preserving the community’s trust in the 
criminal justice system.  They emphasized the importance of “an ongoing dia-
logue”; one noted: 
It’s crucial that people know what we’re doing.  If there are racial or 
homophobic slurs but the evidence is not strong enough to warrant a 
hate crime charge, it’s important to convey to people what the burden 
of proof is, to explain to them that this is why we’re doing what we’re 
doing.263 
Many agreed that “explaining to families why we’re not charging” was crucial, 
along with “telling the victim what evidence we have, what the time frame is, and 
following up with them.”264  A Northwest prosecutor insisted, “It usually works.  
People have fears for themselves and for their community.  They want to make 
sure we understand what bias crimes are.”265  Those prosecutors that stressed the 
importance of transparency also highlighted the delicacy of relationships between 
communities and the importance of the criminal justice system in serving as a 
mediator.  One noted, “[T]his job is really important from a social work angle, 
building bridges with communities.  If handled badly, it can destroy relation-
  
concerns about alienating a jury, the interest group members might be more understanding.  See 
infra notes 263–267 and accompanying text. 
262. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2013) (providing that “except for statements 
that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that 
serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, [a prosecutor shall] refrain from making extrajudicial 
comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused”). 
263. Interview 22.  
264. Interviews 30, 31. 
265. Interview 5. 
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ships.”266  Another cautioned, “No kind of case can spin out of control more 
quickly.”267 
Concerned about the widespread volatility associated with hate crimes, law 
enforcement officers and other interested parties might coordinate statewide coa-
litions to monitor and address bias crimes.  For example, Michigan prosecutors 
referred to the Michigan Alliance Against Hate Crimes (MIAAHC), a coordi-
nated effort among prosecutors and community groups that meets monthly.268  
One prosecutor explained, “MIAAHC assists prosecutors, explaining why these 
cases are so important, their effect on the victim and the community.  A bar fight 
is very different from an assault based on ethnicity, and it’s important to educate 
people about why these crimes are so different.”269  This coalition between crimi-
nal justice actors and community groups could be replicated throughout the 
country to better synchronize hate crime enforcement efforts with the objectives 
of hate crime legislation. 
Efforts to increase transparency through coalition building would no doubt 
be criticized or even rejected by some prosecutors.  While a few prosecutors ex-
pressed satisfaction that interest groups felt comfortable reaching out to them,270 
others mentioned that, while this level of contact is a positive factor in theory, it is 
also complicated because interest group members have a different agenda.  For 
example, interest group members may pressure prosecutors to investigate crimes 
that involve their members as hate crimes even if there is no evidence of a bias 
motive.271  Specifically, according to a prosecutor from a large Northeastern city, 
interest group members tend not to distinguish “between crimes involving and 
targeting a community,” referring to the transgender community as a particularly 
vocal interest group in that jurisdiction.272  More skeptical prosecutors stressed 
that they “don’t want to appear to be in solidarity with these folks” and would 
  
266. Interview 31. 
267. Interview 30. 
268. MICH. ALLIANCE AGAINST HATE CRIMES, http://miaahc.com (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
269. Interview 7. 
270. A California prosecutor explained, “[I]t’s fantastic to help the black community, to signal that we 
care about [their] group.”  Interview 24.  A New York prosecutor mentioned that interest groups 
can be helpful, especially “those that take time and are patient with the criminal justice system.”  
Interview 28. 
271. A few of the prosecutors who described themselves as open to interacting with interest group 
members noted that “it sometimes gets emotional and we feel pressure to conduct the investigation 
quickly.”  Interviews 19, 28.  A few prosecutors also mentioned that they had been pressured to 
include hate crime charges in cases involving a white victim and that, upon refusing, allegations of 
“reverse discrimination” abounded.  Interviews 27, 30.  In each such case, the prosecutor with 
whom I spoke insisted that there was not enough evidence to show a hate motive and that, if there 
were, hate crime charges would certainly have been filed. 
272. Interview 31. 
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therefore take whatever steps are necessary to maintain the impression that “we 
can’t be swayed.”273  Southern prosecutors referenced black preachers as particu-
larly vocal.274  Northeastern prosecutors who preferred to limit contact with inter-
est groups expressed a similar sentiment but, when asked about which interest 
groups were most vocal in their jurisdictions, they consistently referred to the gay, 
lesbian, and transgendered communities.275  A uniting concern, however, was the 
expressive message sent to the district’s constituents and, specifically, the prose-
cutors’ strong desire to maintain the appearance of neutrality.  The dissemination 
of guidelines for prosecutors’ use when interacting with victims and other inter-
ested parties might ameliorate some of these concerns and provide guidance to 
prosecutors for avoiding the extremes of either appearing to ignore victims’ needs 
or appearing to pander to interest groups. 
3. Expanding the Role of the State Attorney General 
While altering prosecutorial incentives may help to better transmit a mes-
sage of tolerance and respect for diversity, any large-scale efforts to reduce hate 
crimes must necessarily look beyond the criminal justice system.  Legislators 
might consider enlisting the help of non–criminal justice actors to transmit mes-
sages of tolerance associated with hate crime legislation—for example, by looking 
to the state attorney general to enforce the legislation through civil litigation. 
Eight states have enacted civil hate crime legislation, which empowers the 
attorney general to file for injunctive relief in tandem with, or instead of, criminal 
prosecution.276  Five of these states have integrated these civil hate crime laws into 
  
273. Interviews 3, 5, 7.  Many stressed that they “don’t want to appear to be pandering” and that the 
“appearance of undue influence” is to be avoided at all costs.  See, e.g., Interviews 9, 22. 
274. A number of prosecutors from the South shared some version of the following sentiment: 
If you are in the South and you are a white prosecutor, and you say I’m sending a 
message, this won’t be tolerated.  The black community might see it as validating, 
but the white community sees it as pandering.  And even the black community will 
be skeptical.  The proof is in the pudding.  They will prefer a long sentence.  Maybe 
in New York, they use hate crime legislation to send a message.  Here, we just want 
to put him away.  If black preachers call me, I say “I don’t want to talk to you.”  If I 
do what they want, they’ll think they have sway.  And we must appear to be inde-
pendent.  If they scream too much and the DA does what they want, it seems it’s 
only because they’re vocal. 
 Interview 25; see also Interviews 1, 4, 8, 15. 
275. Interviews 28, 31. 
276. For a detailed account of the role of state attorneys general in combating hate crimes, see Amy 
Dieterich, The Role of the State Attorney General in Preventing and Punishing Hate Crimes 
Through Civil Prosecution: Positive Experiences and Possible First Amendment Potholes, 61 ME. L. 
REV. 521 (2009). 
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their wider efforts to combat hate violence.277  Whereas criminal prosecution fo-
cuses on the individual crime and individual victim, when the attorney general 
seeks injunctive relief the focus is more on the hate crime as a community crime 
and on the expressive goal of sending a message to citizens that hate crimes are 
unacceptable in our civil society.278  This stated focus on sending a message may 
be, from an expressivist perspective, an advantage of civil injunctions over crimi-
nal prosecutions in hate crime cases. 
Injunctive relief may take many forms but often includes a stay-away or-
der.279  Judges are not always receptive to the attorney general as plaintiff, and in-
junctive relief often is denied “when the judge thinks it’s overkill”—for example, 
when a stay-away order is sought against a defendant who is already under house 
arrest.280  Nonetheless, this approach is supported by some interest groups who 
highlight it as a way to ensure that the victim and those similarly situated are pro-
tected, especially since criminal prosecutions do not always yield success.281 
Furthermore, the attorney general’s office is not tasked with the huge case-
load of the district attorney and thus may be able to provide more individual at-
tention to victims and their families.  Some contend that “victims relate better to 
the civil side” as opposed to criminal law enforcement actors and that, by compar-
ison, those victims who work with the attorney general report receiving “Cadillac 
treatment.”282  Moreover, the expeditious nature of injunctive relief may provide a 
sense of catharsis that is distinct from what many victims describe as the emo-
tional rollercoaster of a criminal investigation and prosecution.283  Finally, the at-
torney general’s office may wait until injunctive relief is granted before sending 
out a press release.284  This control over timing and substance of media exposure 
allows the attorney general to tailor the media attention according to its specifica-
tions, further distinguishing this civil approach from criminal prosecution.285  
  
277. Id. at 527.  These states include Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and West 
Virginia.  Id. 
278. Interviews 11, 30. 
279. See Dieterich, supra note 276, at 526–27 (highlighting, as an advantage of the civil approach, that 
“civil injunctions can be permanent, while stay away orders as part of a criminal prosecution 
normally only last for short periods of time”). 
280. Interview 11. 
281. Interviews 10, 11, 12, 19. 
282. Interviews 11, 12. 
283. Interview 19. 
284. Interview 11. 
285. For a discussion of problems associated with media coverage of criminal prosecutions, see, for 
example, Mark J. Geragos, The Thirteenth Juror: Media Coverage of Supersized Trials, 39 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 1167, 1168 (2006), which argues that “[t]he ‘supersize’ nature of these cases is created by 
the media rather than reflected by it, as journalists . . . capitalize on the public’s apparently insatiable 
appetite for all things sensational.” 
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D. Beyond the Hate Crime Context 
While the hate crime context is unique in its history, development, and so-
cial and cultural details, its lessons are relevant for institutional actors concerned 
about expressive enforcement more broadly.  The Article’s focus on hate crime 
laws highlights the significance of the role of the legislature not only in enacting 
new criminal legislation but also in anticipating how it will be used in practice.  
For instance, the hate crime example suggests that when legislators add a tool to 
prosecutors’ proverbial toolbox they should consider what incentives, whether 
statutory, political, or otherwise, might influence prosecutors in their use of the 
legislation.  Legislators should pay heed to when the preamble of a statute does 
not accord with the text of the statute itself and consider how the statute is likely 
to be used in practice, quite apart from any stated legislative intent. 
As a default presumption, when new criminal laws are enacted, legislators 
might consider allocating funds for training police and prosecutors and designat-
ing special officers to serve as point people in their offices.  Of course, prosecutors 
will always be operating under resource constraints, and legislators have real deci-
sions to make about how to channel state funds.  But legislators concerned about 
continuity in messaging should also concern themselves with how, and whether, 
their laws are enforced. 
The statutory interaction issue confronting prosecutors tasked with enforc-
ing hate crimes also provides a cautionary lesson for legislators in other contexts.  
Arguably, the more expressive the legislation, meaning the more its enactment is 
justified on expressive grounds, the more significant the potential for a gap be-
tween enactment and enforcement messaging.  Especially with laws designed to 
be norm affecting or to protect vulnerable groups, legislators should carefully 
consider the interaction between proposed criminal statutes and preexisting legis-
lation; if the new statute is worded such that it functions as a less desirable alter-
native to an existing statute, law enforcement may deem it worthless and not look 
to the statute as a resource.  Law enforcement’s designation of a new statute as 
useless may be particularly problematic if interest groups understood the legisla-
tion’s enactment as being of great significance to the wellbeing of their members 
and society as a whole. 
The issue of what determinations will be made by a jury versus a judge may 
also be a factor in a prosecutor’s decision whether to include particular charges.  If 
jury instructions for a particular charge are especially complex, prosecutors may be 
less inclined to include that charge.  Legislators ought to consider the complexity 
of jury instructions in determining whether an enhancement is more suitable as a 
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separate charge for jury consideration or instead as an issue for the judge’s deter-
mination at sentencing. 
Lessons from the hate crime context are also relevant to other areas of law 
enforcement in which relationships with victims, victim groups, and other inter-
ested parties may prove especially volatile, such as cases involving domestic vio-
lence and child abuse.  Ultimately, the level of trust that law enforcement is able 
to build with victims and victims’ groups through efforts to increase transparency 
and build coalitions may prove of particular significance in sending a unified gov-
ernmental message that these crimes are taken seriously and will not be tolerated 
in our civil society. 
CONCLUSION 
While enactment-enforcement gaps are widespread in criminal law, this 
discrepancy is uniquely significant in the context of laws that are understood to 
“send a message.”  When legislators enact a new law to protect a particular 
group, that piece of legislation is imbued with expressive force for members of 
the group and society as a whole.  If prosecutors are understood to be sending a 
different or contrary message through their enforcement decisions, this expres-
sive force is significantly undercut.  An exclusive focus on the enactment of such 
legislation is therefore misguided. 
The disconnect between institutional incentives that govern the promulga-
tion and enforcement of hate crime legislation should concern government actors 
and others who strive to send a consistent message against hate-motivated vio-
lence.  If prosecutorial incentives are not strategically aligned with legislative ex-
pression, community support upon enactment of legislation may be transformed 
into confusion and disillusionment at the stage of implementation.  Moreover, 
synchronicity between legislative goals and prosecutorial incentives is crucial not 
only to combating hate-motivated violence but, more broadly, to the propagation 
of any legislative message through expressive enforcement. 
APPENDIX I: QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY 
This study consists of in-depth interviews with fifty-two prosecutors.  I lim-
ited my sample to prosecutors from states that have enacted hate crime legisla-
tion.  I further limited the interviews to prosecutors from offices in urban, 
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metropolitan districts with populations of at least 200,000 people.286  My inter-
views with prosecutors included twenty-seven men and twenty-five women.  
While I did not ask the interviewees to disclose their race, ethnicity, or sexual ori-
entation, five self-identified as African American, three self-identified as Asian 
American, and one self-identified as gay. 
I chose to interview prosecutors in order to gain a nuanced account of the 
range of incentives faced by prosecutors in hate crime cases.  The format of 
semistructured interviews287 was ideal because, in order to gain a rich understand-
ing of these incentives, I needed to ask follow-up questions about prosecutorial 
choices, to inquire about the intricacies of office structure and protocol, and to 
gain a sense of the cultural and historical factors that distinguish jurisdictions 
from one another.288 
I selected prosecutors based on size of office, region of the country, and type 
of hate crime statute.  In offices that included designated individuals who oversaw 
hate crime cases, whether as part of a hate crime unit or not, I interviewed prose-
cutors who were in charge of hate crime prosecution efforts.  Eight of the indi-
viduals with whom I spoke were either heads of their hate crimes unit or the 
  
286. For purposes of triangulation, I also spoke with fourteen interest group leaders from ten 
organizations, which included advocacy groups for minorities based on the protected characteristics 
of race, ethnicity, religion, and sexuality. 
287. For a detailed treatment of qualitative research methods, see MARGARET C. HARRELL & 
MELISSA A. BRADLEY, DATA COLLECTION METHODS: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
AND FOCUS GROUPS (2009); GARY KING ET AL , DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC 
INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1994); Sandy Q. Qu & John Dumay, The Qualitative 
Research Interview, 3 QUALITATIVE RES. ACCT. & MGMT. 238 (2011). 
288. For a broad array of qualitative studies in the social science literature that feature semistructured 
interviews, see Ann-Kristin Achleitner et al., New Look: Going Private With Private Equity Support, 
31 J. BUS. STRATEGY 38 (2010); Laura Bernardi, A Mixed-Methods Social Networks Study Design 
for Research on Transnational Families, 73 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 788, 793 (2011); Ruth Branson et 
al., Binge Eating as a Major Phenotype of Melanocortin 4 Receptor Gene Mutations, 348 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1096, 1098 (2003); Laura Camfield et al., Wellbeing Research in Developing Countries: 
Reviewing the Role of Qualitative Methods, 90 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 5, 10 (2009); RJ Cooper et 
al., Ethical Decision-Making, Passivity and Pharmacy, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 441, 442 (2008); Keith 
Guzik, The Agencies of Abuse: Intimate Abusers’ Experience of Presumptive Arrest and Prosecution, 42 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 111, 115 (2008); Carolyn M. Hendriks, Policy Design Without Democracy? 
Making Democratic Sense of Transition Management, 42 POL’Y SCI. 341, 343 & n.4 (2009); Tomas 
M. Koontz & Elizabeth Moore Johnson, One Size Does Not Fit All: Matching Breadth of Stakeholder 
Participation to Watershed Group Accomplishments, 37 POL’Y SCI. 185, 191 (2004); Helen B. 
Marrow, Immigrant Bureaucratic Incorporation: The Dual Roles of Professional Missions and 
Government Policies, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 756, 759 (2009); David Orzechowicz, Privileged Emotion 
Managers: The Case of Actors, 71 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 143, 145 (2008); Peter Ross & Greg J. 
Bamber, Strategic Choices in Pluralist and Unitarist Employment Relations Regimes: A Study of 
Australian Telecommunications, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 24, 25 (2009); Clare M. Ryan, 
Leadership in Collaborative Policy-Making: An Analysis of Agency Roles in Regulatory Negotiations, 34 
POL’Y SCI. 221 (2001).  
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office’s point person for hate crime cases.  In offices that did not have such desig-
nated individuals, I spoke to line prosecutors who had been working in the office 
for at least five years in order to get a sense of how the office dealt with hate crime 
cases over time.  In some cases, a prosecutor from one office provided a name of 
someone in another office who had dealt with hate crime cases.  My interviews 
thus involved a combination of preselecting offices based on statutory and geo-
graphic diversity and using a snowball approach.  I interviewed two of the prose-
cutors in person in their offices and the rest by phone.  I transcribed the 
interviews by taking notes during the conversations. 
The interviews began with background questions about the prosecutors’ 
professional experience.  I asked the prosecutors how long they had been 
working in the office, what divisions they had worked in, and what, if any, pri-
or legal positions they had held.  I then inquired about how hate crime prose-
cution worked in their office, whether the office had a specialized hate crime 
unit or designated personnel to oversee hate crime prosecution, whether the 
office had any written policy regarding when hate crime charges should be 
filed, and whether the office kept records regarding hate crime reports or dis-
position.  I asked each prosecutor to walk me through the process from arrest 
to trial, focusing on how hate crime charges (and, specifically, the decision 
whether or not to add hate crime charges) factored in at each stage.  I also in-
quired about the prosecutors’ interaction with police in hate crime cases and 
about what kind of training, if any, was given to police and prosecutors about 
hate crime legislation. 
I then asked whether the prosecutors were aware of any hate crime prosecu-
tions in their office and whether they had personal experiences prosecuting or su-
pervising a hate crime case.  If so, I asked them to detail the facts of the case, the 
charging decision, and the ultimate disposition.  If not, I asked them whether 
they or others in their office had ever considered adding a hate crime charge and, 
if so, why they opted against doing so.  I also asked about their interaction with 
interest groups about hate crime cases or alleged hate crime cases and whether 
they had ever received feedback about their charging decision in an allegedly bias-
motivated case. 
The last part of the interviews explored the prosecutors’ views on the effica-
cy of hate crime legislation.  I inquired whether a given crime that fit the relevant 
statutory definition of a hate crime might not be prosecuted as such and, if so, for 
what reasons.  When prosecutors mentioned regional or cultural aspects of their 
office, I followed up with questions to flesh out these explanations in an attempt 
to better understand their answers in historical, political, and cultural contexts. 
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I coded themes that arose throughout the interviews, such as concerns about 
appealing to a jury and concerns about the underreporting of hate crimes.  To 
complement the open-ended interview questions, I also asked and charted inter-
viewees’ answers to specific, directed questions.  For example, I asked prosecutors 
whether, if police did not flag a case as potentially bias-motivated in their report, 
the motive in such a case would likely go unnoticed.  I also inquired whether the 
prosecutors supported the use of hate crime charges in nonarchetypal cases or 
were skeptical of such use.  Finally, I asked whether the prosecutors believed it to 
be part of their institutional role to send a message about social norms through 
their charging decisions or whether their goal was individualized justice on a 
case-by-case basis. 
APPENDIX II: STATE HATE CRIME LAWS 
The following chart distills the main features of state hate crime laws.289  
First, it indicates if a state hate crime statute requires animus (as opposed to 
intentional selection).  Second, it indicates what categories are protected by the 
  
289. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-13 (LexisNexis 2009); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(22) (2012); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1750; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-123-106 (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.55 (West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
9-121 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-58 (West 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
53a-181j (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1304 (2007); D.C. CODE § 22-3701 
(LexisNexis 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085 (West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
706-662(6)(b) (LexisNexis 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7902 (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT ANN. 5/12-7.1 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-13-3-1 (LexisNexis 2003); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 729A.2 (West 2013); IOWA CODE ANN. § 712.9 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-6815 (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.031 (LexisNexis 2008); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 14:107.2 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1151 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. 
tit. 25, § 1544 (2007); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-304 (LexisNexis 2012); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 39 (LexisNexis 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b (West 
2004); MINN. STAT. § 626.5531 (2003); MINN. STAT. § 609.749 (2003); MINN. STAT. § 
609.2231 (2003); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-19-301 (2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 557.035 
(West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-222 (2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-111 (2008); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193.1675 (LexisNexis 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6 
(2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:16-1 (West 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18B-3 (2013); 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05 (McKinney 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-3 (2011); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 14-401.14 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99D-1 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1340.16(d)(17) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-04 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2927.12 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 850 (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.155 (2011); 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2710 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-38 (2002); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19B-1 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-114 (2010); TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.014 (West 2006); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.47 (West 
2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.3, 203.4 (LexisNexis 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 
1455 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080 
(West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-6-21 (LexisNexis 2000); WIS. STAT. § 939.645 
(2011–12); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-9-102 (2003). 
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[3] States protect physical disability only. 
[4] Aggravating factor applies only when offender is under considera-
tion for probation or parole. 
[5] State definition of hate crime encompasses both animus alone and 
intentional selection alone. 
[6] State requires both animus and intentional selection together. 
[7] State includes sensory disability as protected category. 
